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ABSTRACT 
Implementing a proactive approach to deny, disrupt, and defeat terrorist networks that 
threaten U.S. national interests is a critical capability required by the U.S. government.  
The challenge arising from these threats stems from the semi- and non-permissive 
environments where U.S. freedom of action is reduced or non-existent.  The purpose of 
this thesis is to propose a system that effectively integrates intelligence and operations in 
order to conduct a proactive method to global counter-terrorism (CT) operations in these 
arenas.  This system is based on the Network Targeting Cycle- Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, 
and Analyze (F3EA) utilized by USSOF most recently in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also 
in the recent past during the conflict in Vietnam and narco-terrorism operations in South 
America.  The scope of this thesis is to examine how the U.S. military can develop a 
global CT approach using the F3EA process based on an interagency, allied, and host-
nation collaborative environment. 
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A. DIYALA PROVINCE IRAQ, INSURGENT SAFEHOUSE: 01:03 AM, 14 
JUNE 2009 
The door exploded.  Smoke, dust, and sand cloaked a team of sixteen heavily 
armed men as they methodically filtered into the void and rapidly dominated every room 
of the mud-plastered building.  In time measured by seconds rather than minutes, the 
team had detained and flex-cuffed all military-aged males on site and began transferring 
data obtained on the target.  It was received instantly by the task force operations officer 
who was monitoring the mission’s progress from a remote location via satellite.  Papers 
and physical evidence not transferable via SATCOM were separated, photographed, 
bagged, and diligently annotated as to where the items were found.  To accompany the 
items taken from the objective area, the team leader made a rough sketch of the 
compound, to include the layout of the building’s rooms.  Particular attention and care 
was given to the electronic media found on site, since, as was learned through tough 
experience, analysts could retrieve and piece together remnants of data left on hard drives 
and other memory devices. These sources often provided critical details on the detainee’s 
network of associates and activities.  Specially trained members of the strike team 
segregated and questioned each of the detainees to determine if they could garner 
information that may lead to an immediate follow-on target.  Those individuals refusing 
to cooperate or deemed of possible intelligence value were identified and quickly 
escorted to the waiting helicopter.  These individuals would receive additional screening 
upon return to the team’s base.   Once the mission commander had deemed that all 
intelligence of value was gleaned from the site, he issued the order to begin exfiltration.  
As his men and detainees moved past him to the exfiltration aircraft, he made one last 
sweep of the area to ensure the site exploitation team had secured everything that might 
have potential intelligence value.  
Upon return to base, while the detention team escorted those apprehended to the 
screening facility, the exploitation team rushed the items seized on the objective to the 
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task force operations’ center staff.  The sense of urgency to sift through documents, disks, 
computer hard drives, and cellular phones was palpable.  It was a well-rehearsed battle 
drill to pass these items to the resident exploitation experts (computer forensic, 
translators, and signals specialists) who would both swiftly and meticulously look for the 
evidence of malfeasance, as well as new information that might be actionable.  While this 
was occurring, the remaining team members would recheck their own equipment, return 
to their prep area, and replace any items expended during the raid. They would then do 
the same to the gear of the absent team members, who would likely return soon with a 
follow-on mission gleaned from the captured information and material.  Once the 
information was processed and the links established, they would re-board the helicopters, 
sometimes within hours of the first one, to strike the next piece of the insurgent puzzle. 
B. BACKGROUND  
This scenario took place on an almost daily basis, often multiple times each 
evening, across cities in Iraq between 2004 and 2009.  U.S. Special Operations Forces 
had become experts at disrupting, denying, and defeating terrorist networks through a 
synchronized targeting cycle they perfected and called F3EA: Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, 
and Analyze.  It is a cycle that works. 
Unfortunately, most people, both inside and outside the military, are often 
distracted by the explosions, the heroic warriors, the excitement and the dangers that 
create the popular aura of a midnight raid.  They forget that the “finish” phase in the 
process, the action that leads to the capture or killing of a High Value Individual (HVI), is 
only the middle stage in a much more complex cycle.  Most often, the real importance of 
the mission is the additional intelligence that is collected that leads one step closer to the 
elimination of a terror network, one terrorist, one cell, one node at a time.  In the F3EA 
cycle, a considerable portion of the critical effort is conducted by the exploitation and 
analysis (or EA) teams: located “behind the wire” on forward operating bases.  Working 
as a team, it these “EA specialists,” the military intelligence officers, computer forensics 
technicians, and translators who develop the operational picture for the high value target.   
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It is through time-sensitive exploitation and analysis that they find the links, fissures, and 
nodes that must be severed to the collapse of the enemy network.  Without them, the 
high-profile finish force is blind and dumb.  
How did F3EA come into being?  While the term F3EA has gained significant use 
by select counter-terrorism units, in Iraq and Afghanistan, the principles for F3EA 
emerged over time, and are based on historic U.S. experiences confronting threats from 
decentralized adversary networks.  How might a broader understanding of F3EA be 
useful to enhancing U.S. national security?  Terrorism is not a threat only faced by the 
United States.  Can the F3EA concept be exported to allies?  Under what conditions?  
This thesis will highlight the need for such exportation.  It will propose an organizational 
design for a worldwide network of Operations and Intelligence Fusion Nodes that can 
apply F3EA to effectively conduct counterterrorism (CT) operations against transnational 
terrorist networks.  Chapter II will examine the foundation and overview of the F3EA.  
The following three chapters then provide historical examples that illustrate how the 
process was developed in different political environments: during the Phoenix Program in 
Vietnam; the interdiction of narco-terrorist networks in South and Central American; and 
operations against the Al Qaeda terrorist network in Iraq (AQI).  After examining these 
historic elements in the evolution of F3EA, Chapter IV will present a hypothetical 
scenario that illustrates the critical role a globally linked network of Fusion Nodes can 
play in combating the global terrorist threat.  Lastly, an Appendix will provide the 
organizational design aspect for these Fusion Nodes. 
 4 
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II. THE FOUNDATIONS OF F3EA 
This chapter will provide the foundation for the F3EA process.  It will begin by 
outlining the requirements for effective targeting of organizations that are decentralized 
and demonstrate how targeting these networks is different from targeting organizations 
that are hierarchical.  It will then define some of the different environments where F3EA 
can occur, provide an overview of existing military targeting doctrine, and provide a 
detailed examination of the F3EA process.  Finally, the chapter will focus on the 
insurgent model, highlight the importance of targeting insurgent infrastructure and 
explain why targeting of insurgent networks and terrorist networks are similar. 
A. COUNTER-STATE VS. COUNTER-NETWORK BASED TARGETING 
Historically, the U.S. military has focused on targeting enemy militaries that are 
large, hierarchical organizations.  In previous conflicts such as WWI, WWII, Korea, and 
the Cold War, the threat to the U.S. was from other states, not non-state actors.  However, 
in contrast, Al Qaeda and its regional affiliates, which are the primary focus for GWOT 
operations, are actually organized as a comparatively small, decentralized, scale-free 
network.  This section will discuss the theory behind network based targeting and the 
balance between the size of the Find/Fix and Finish forces for the different enemy 
structures. 
Using F3EA to conduct network based targeting in CT operations is a deliberate 
process that identifies key nodes that act as hubs in a network for removal.  As previously 
discussed, it is not a piece-meal strategy that merely identifies members of the enemy 
organization and eliminates any target of opportunity.  A fundamental property of scale-
free networks is that some nodes have a large number of connections to other nodes, 
while the majority of nodes only have a small number of connections; these highly 
connected nodes are called hubs.1  Sageman refers to AQ and its affiliates as the global 
Salafi jihad and describes their organizational structure as a scale-free network where “[a] 
                                                 
1 Albert-Laszlo Barabasi and Eric Bonabeau, “Scale-Free Networks,” Scientific American, May 2003, 
52. 
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few highly connected hubs dominate the architecture.”2  Scale-free networks are 
extremely resilient to random removal of nodes, because any random attack will typically 
only remove a small number of the hubs that are critical to the survival of the network.3  
However, they are extremely vulnerable to focused attacks against the hubs, because the 
removal of 5 to 15 percent of the hubs can fragment the network.4  According to 
Sageman, attacking the hubs and fragmenting the network can significantly reduce AQ 
and its affiliates’ ability to conduct large-scale sophisticated terrorist attacks.5  
Identifying, Finding, and Fixing the hubs in the AQ network in order to conduct Finish 
operations against them is difficult and requires the correct mix of capabilities. 
One of the differences between targeting a large, state, military structure and a 
relatively small, decentralized, scale-free network structure is the composition of the 
force used.  Typically, a state enemy structure involves large military units that have 
significant amounts of military equipment.  They are distinguishable from the civilian 
population and are significantly easier to Find and Fix.  However, based on their size and 
firepower, conducting Finish operations against this type of enemy can be challenging.  
As a result, the size of the force required to Find and Fix this type of enemy is relative 
small compared to the size of the force required to Finish it.  As an example, the 
intelligence section of an infantry battalion, which is approximately 500 personnel, 
typically has three to five intelligence specialists in it.  On the opposite side of the 
spectrum, an enemy, such as AQ and its affiliates, has a small, decentralized scale-free 
network structure.  Since this type of enemy consists of networks of individuals and small 
cells that are geographically dispersed and can easily blend into the civilian population, it 
can be significantly more difficult to Find and Fix targets, while Finish operations against 
this type of enemy can be comparatively easier than Finish operations targeting larger 
military organizations.  In this situation, the size of the Find and Fix force is larger and 
the size of the Finish force smaller.  See Figure 1 for a graphical representation.  In 
                                                 
2 Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2004), 137. 
3 Barabasi and Bonabeau, “Scale-Free Networks,” 56. 
4 Barabasi and Bonabeau, “Scale-Free Networks,” 56. 
5 Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, 140. 
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Figure 1, the x-axis denotes the enemy organizational structure; on the left of the 
spectrum you have an enemy with a network based structure, while on the right you have 
an enemy with a state based structure.  The y-axis denotes the size of the friendly force 
required to conduct F3EA operations against the enemy.  The dotted line denotes the size 
of the Find/Fix force, while the solid line denotes the size of the Finish force.  As is 
evident from the graph, as you move from a state based structure on the right to a 
network based structure on the left, the size of the Find/Fix force increases and while the 
size of the Finish force decreases.  This is significant, because any organization that is 
designed to conduct CT operations will require an extremely robust Find/Finish element.  
 
Figure 1.   Find/Fix and Finish Force Size vs. Enemy Organization Structure 
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B. CURRENT TARGETING DOCTRINE 
The conventional military defines the term targeting as part of the military 
decision making process used to focus battlefield operating systems (BOSs) to achieve 
the commander’s intent.  In order to accomplish this, the targeting methodology used is 
known as Decide, Detect, Deliver and Assess (D3A).  See Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2.    Decide, Detect, Deliver, and Assess (D3A) Targeting Process6 
While it is not necessary to examine each phase of the D3A, it is important to 
understand that it is designed to target enemy organizations that use a hierarchical 
structure, not networks.  Although it does have a few similarities as the F3EA, it is not 
the same.  The reason it is not is because the D3A process is designed to destroy non-
related targets such as an enemy vehicle staging areas or a tank column.  The destruction 
of one tank column does not provide information that leads to the next column.  While 
this targeting process is very effective during conventional war, the very nature of it does 
not lend itself to decentralized networks.  The targeting process that is effective very 
effective against these types of networks is the F3EA. 
C. FIND, FIX, FINISH, EXPLOIT AND ANALYZE PROCESS (F3EA) 
The breaching of the door to the terrorist’s house was just one phase of a targeting 
cycle designed to deny, disrupt, and defeat a terrorist network.  The five phases of the 
targeting cycle are: Find, Fix, Finish, Exploitation, and Analysis (F3EA) (Figure 3). 
                                                 




Figure 3.   Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, and Analyze Targeting Process 
The concept of the targeting cycle was to combine analysts who found the 
target (Find); assets such as drone to pinpoint the targets exact location 
(Fix); an assault force that captured or killed the target (Finish); specialists 
who exploited the intelligence the raid yielded (Exploitation); and the 
intelligence analysts who turned this raw information into usable 
knowledge (Analysis).  The goal is to speed up the cycle for a 
counterterrorism operations in order to gather valuable insights in hours, 
not days.7  
A thorough understanding of the targeting cycle and speed enables U.S. CT forces 
to attack the networks faster than the enemy can regenerate them.  This is critical because 
it reverses the historical information advantage terrorist networks and insurgencies have 
over CT and COIN forces.  Typically, a terrorist network or insurgency uses the 
population to remain underground and hidden because it has a force disadvantage.  It uses 
its intelligence and information network to remain one step ahead of the larger security 
and CT forces and attack at a time and place of its choosing.8  However, following a 
finish operation, terrorist network and insurgency loses the information advantage for a 
brief period of time because it needs to figure out who was captured or killed, what 
                                                 
7 Stanley A. McChrystal, “It Takes a Network.” Foreign Policy, March-April 2011. 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/02/22/it_takes_a_network. 
8 Gordon H. McCormick, “A Systems Model of Insurgency,” (Naval Postgraduate School, Department 
of Defense Analysis, 2006). 
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information was compromised, and how the security or CT forces were even able to 
obtain the required information to conduct the finish operation in the first place.  At this 
point, the security or CT forces now have the information advantage.  If they are able to 
quickly and effectively continue to utilize the F3EA targeting process, they can to 
degrade the network or insurgency until it is ultimately unable to reconstitute itself, and 
therefore defeated.  In order to understand how this is possible, it is necessary to examine 
each phase of the targeting process. 
The first phase of the targeting cycle is the find.  The intent of this phase is to 
identify the individuals associated within the targeted network.  This information can 
come from a variety of sources through analysis of collected intelligence.  This 
information provides a general starting point in which to leverage resources to locate 
targeted individuals within the network.  U.S. CT forces are able to use a vast array of 
technical means to facilitate this phase.     
The next phase of the targeting cycle is the fixing.  The key to this phase is 
actually locating the targeted individual.  This enables information to be gathered about 
the individual’s pattern of life (PoL) and any other potential associates of the network.  
U.S. CT forces utilize a combination of human intelligence and surveillance aircraft to 
accomplish this.  This involves maintaining constant surveillance, often referred to in 
U.S. CT terms as the “unblinking eye” on the targeted individual.  It is important to 
understand that a level of tactical patience is required to develop the targeted individual’s 
PoL and associates prior to executing the third phase of the targeting cycle.  Once the 
appropriate trigger is met, the next phase begins.   
The third phase of the targeting cycle is the finishing phase.  In the early hours of 
2 May 2011, U.S. helicopters carrying Navy SEALs launched from a staging base in 
Afghanistan after meeting trigger to conduct an operation to kill or capture Osama Bin 
Laden in Abbottabad, Pakistan.  This trigger is typically based on an established set of 
criteria such as human, imagery, and/or signals intelligence that produces a high degree 
of certainty that the targeted individual is in a specific location.  Ideally, the finishing 
phase is ideally conducted during hours of limited visibility for two reasons.  First, the 
targeted individual(s) are usually at their bed-down location, and therefore they are 
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stationary for longer periods of time.  Second, it is easier during low-light hours to isolate 
targeted individual’s location and prevent anyone from escaping before the cordon is 
established because most others are also asleep.  The goal of the finishing phase is 
twofold.  The first is to gather more information on the network, and the second is to kill 
or capture the targeted individual(s).  In order to accomplish this, the question which 
needs to be answered before executing any finishing operation is, “How does this get us 
further along in regards to deny, disrupting, or defeating the entire network?”  Failure to 
do this causes CT operations to become simply a piece-meal strategy, rather than a 
network approach.9  This question also enables the finishing force to know what 
questions to ask and what to look for during the next phase of the targeting cycle.   
The fourth phase of the targeting cycle is the exploitation.  The goal of this phase 
is to gather as much information on the network as possible on the objective.   A detailed 
search of the objective and good tactical questioning of detainees often provides time 
sensitive information, which if acted upon immediately, results in further degradation of 
the targeted network.  To be effective, it critical to understand that the mission is not over 
just because the target individual was killed or captured, but rather was the start of 
conducting a detailed exploitation of the site to gain information about the network.  
Even though the Navy SEALs had killed Osama Bin Laden, they still conducted a 
detailed search of his compound for any items that might provide further insight into the 
Al Qaeda network.  Often the information gathered during exploitation is time-sensitive 
and requires immediate follow-on objectives.  A thorough exploitation provides a wealth 
of information that needs to be examined during the final phase of the targeting cycle.   
The final phase of the targeting cycle is the analysis phase.  The goal of this phase 
is to analyze the information gathered during exploitation and develop actionable 
intelligence. This intelligence consists of things such as how targeted network operates, 
the roles and functions of its members and where they are located.  U.S. CT forces rely 
on a pool of intelligence analysts to sort through this data and develop potential targets.  
                                                 
9 Author’s Note: “Whack-a-Mole” strategy is a termed referred to when an individual pops up.  This is 
usually after an incident occurs.  It is reactive in nature and not a systematic approach to targeting and 
defeating a network.   
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One of the items recovered by the SEALs during the exploitation of Osama’s compound 
was a series of computer files.  Analysis of these files revealed that a Libyan national 
named Atiyah Abd al-Rahman was deeply involved in running the terror network and 
was in regular communication with Bin Laden.10  On 22 August 2011, Rahman, now 
serving as Al Qaeda’s deputy chief, was reported to have been killed by a U.S. missile 
strike in northwest Pakistan.  It is unknown if the analysis of these files actually 
facilitated Rahman’s death, but there is little doubt that the files elevated his priority in 
the U.S. targeting cycle.  
D. SIMILARITIES OF INSURGENT AND TERRORIST NETWORKS 
While the F3EA process is critical for conducting good unilateral CT operations, 
it also provides a method in which CT forces can integrate intelligence and operations for 
precision targeting as part of a counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy.  For the purpose of 
this thesis, it is necessary to define several key terms in order to understand the 
relationship between CT and COIN.  The term “terrorism” means premeditated, 
politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational 
groups or clandestine agents; and the term “terrorist group” means any group practicing, 
or which has significant subgroups which practice, international terrorism.11  The term 
“insurgency” means the organized use of subversion and violence by a group or 
movement that seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing authority.12   As 
different as these terms are on paper, during actual operations trying to distinguish 
whether someone is simply a terrorist, insurgent or both is much more difficult.  A good 
example of this is the IED cells that targeted American military forces during Operation 
Iraqi Freedom.  By definition, these cells were not terrorists, but rather insurgents.  
However, due to their operating structure, cells like this were more closely aligned to 
                                                 
10 Voice of America News, “US Officials Confident Al-Qaida's No. 2 Killed in Pakistan,” 29 August 
2011, http://www.voanews.com/english/news/US-Officials-Confident-Al-Qaidas-No-2-Killed-in-Pakistan-
128592638.html. 
11 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2010, 18 August 2011, accessed 1 
November 2011, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2010/170265.htm. 
12 Headquarters Department of the Army, FM 3-24Counterinsurgency, 15 December 2006, Glossary 
4, accessed 1 November 2011, http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24.pdf. 
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terrorists groups, rather than traditional military organizations.  It is because of this 
operating structure, CT units are often ideally suited to support COIN efforts.  The reason 
is their use of an integrated intelligence and operations network targeting process is 
specifically designed to disrupt, deny, and defeat these kinds of cells.  By doing this, CT 
units can provide time for a government’s military, paramilitary, political, economic, 
psychological, and civic actions that are necessary to defeat an insurgency to become 
effective.13   This relationship can be seen Figure 4.  
 
Figure 4.   The CT-COIN Relationship 
However, traditional type military units that are not well versed in the F3EA 
process and not properly resourced to do precision targeting can often have the opposite 
effect.  In the case of Iraq, conventional forces often used large-scale sweep operations 
based on limited intelligence to target IED or indirect fire (IDF) networks.  Not only did 
these operations often upset the local populace, but they also resulted in the unwarranted 
detention of many innocent Iraqi civilians.  In addition to sweep operations, their 
                                                 
13 Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 8 
November 2010, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf. 
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attempts to use their limited ISR in an effort to target networks such as IED or IDF cells 
often produced little tangible results.14   This concept can be easily summarized by 
understanding that good CT efforts buy time in COIN, where as bad one reduce it.   
As part of this CT effort to buy time, attacking insurgent infrastructure through 
the means of targeting senior leadership, denying critical resources, and forcing 
insurgents to divert resources to defensive operations are all valuable components of a 
COIN campaign.15  This effort enables the building the legitimacy of the government and 
establishing government control of the population, which is number one priority in 
COIN.16 
In order to better understand how targeting the insurgency’s infrastructure 
supports COIN, it is necessary to define what constitutes the insurgent infrastructure, as 
well as provide a brief overview of the insurgent model.  An insurgent organization can 
be considered a system where inputs are passed through a conversion mechanism that 
consists of the insurgent organization’s infrastructure, and the inputs are converted into 
outputs that are the insurgents’ actions; ideally, the results of these actions should 
generate new inputs for the system.17  The inputs for the insurgent system can be internal 
to the country and external to the country; in most insurgencies, the vast majority of 
inputs are generated internally, and they are impacted by insurgent outputs (actions), but 
it is also possible for insurgent outputs to impact the level of external support.18  The 
inputs to the system are in the form of people, information, money, equipment, and 
logistical support, and they are typically obtained through persuasion and coercion.19  
The insurgent infrastructure that converts inputs to outputs consists of all the people that 
                                                 
14 Anonymous Special Operations Soldier.  The information referenced is the result of several 
conversations with an anonymous special operations soldier who had professional interaction with one of 
the authors during his deployments to Iraq from 2008 – 2010. For the remainder of this thesis the short 
reference will be Anonymous Special Operations Soldier. 
15 Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf Jr., Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent 
Conflict (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1970), 79–83. 
16 Eric P. Wendt, “Strategic Counterinsurgency Modeling,” Special Warfare, September 2005: 5-6. 
17 Leites and Wolfe, Rebellion and Authority, 32–34. 
18 Leites and Wolfe, Rebellion and Authority, 32. 
19 Leites and Wolfe, Rebellion and Authority, 32–33. 
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organize personnel; provide financial and logistical support; provide intelligence 
information; and manage recruitment, training, and operations for the insurgency.20  The 
outputs of the system consist of acts of violence, intimidation, military attacks, and public 
demonstrations.21 
Since the models in the preceding section that were used to highlight the need to 
target infrastructure refer to insurgent organizations, it is important to highlight why it is 
valid to apply them toward global CT operations.  This thesis uses Al Qaeda and its 
various branches as the primary terrorist threat to the United States.   According to David 
Kilcullen, an insurgency is “a popular movement that seeks to overthrow the status quo 
through subversion, political activity, insurrection, armed conflict and terrorism,”22 and 
terrorism is defined as “politically motivated violence against non-combatants with the 
intention to coerce through fear.”23  The stated goal of al Qaeda’s global jihad is to 
overthrow the existing order and governments in the Islamic world and replace them with 
an Islamic Caliphate.24  Once established, the Caliphate will then spread Islam 
throughout the rest of the world.  Al Qaeda plans to accomplish this goal in two phases.25  
In the first phase, the main objective is to target the United States and its Western allies to 
force them to withdraw from the Islamic world, which will undermine Western support 
for existing governments in the region.  This will allow al Qaeda to overthrow the 
existing governments in the region and enable them to establish an Islamic Caliphate.  In 
the second phase, once the Caliphate is established, it will be used to conduct an Islamic 
Jihad against the West and to spread Islam to the rest of the world.  As demonstrated by 
the terrorist attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001, terrorism has been 
one of the main tools used by al Qaeda to accomplish their larger political goal of 
coercing the West to withdraw from the Islamic world.  Based on al Qaeda’s goal to 
                                                 
20 Leites and Wolfe, Rebellion and Authority, 34. 
21 Leites and Wolfe, Rebellion and Authority, 34. 
22 David J. Kilcullen, “Countering Global Counterinsurgency,” Journal of Strategic Studies 28, no. 4 
(August 2005): 603. 
23 Kilcullen, “Countering Global Counterinsurgency,” 603. 
24 Kilcullen, “Countering Global Counterinsurgency,” 604. 
25 Kilcullen, “Countering Global Counterinsurgency,” 598. 
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overthrow the existing status quo and their use of terrorism to accomplish this goal, it is 
valid to classify their global jihadist movement as an insurgency.26  Therefore, applying 
lessons from previous COIN campaigns should prove useful when developing strategies 
in the GWOT.  
E. FRICTION POINTS AND RISK 
The method to integrated operations and intelligence through the F3EA targeting 
cycle for global CT and supporting COIN seems like an easy process to follow.  Apply it 
properly with enough speed and resources and all the terrorists’ networks should be 
defeated.  This begs the question, why in reality is this not the case?  The answer is 
friction.  Clausewitz defines friction as the “only concept that more or less corresponds to 
the factors that distinguish real war from war on paper.”27   When it comes to trying to 
apply the FE3A process in the real world, it faces friction in two categories.  The first is 
objective or capabilities friction.  This friction consists of things such as having enough 
resources such as ISR, technical intelligence equipment, timely and accurate intelligence, 
translators, intelligence analysts, sensitive site exploitation equipment, finishing forces, 
aircraft, and screening/detention facilities.  The second category is subjective friction.  
This consists of things such as political approval, organizational culture, battle-space 
deconfliction, sensitive intelligence and operational sharing and dissemination, approval 
authorities, competing agendas by different units and agencies, and host-nation 
cooperation.   In addition, these two categories are affected by different operational 
environments.  In countries like Somalia, which is considered a failed state, the United 
States does not have to seek the same approval requirements to fly ISR compared to a 
politically less permissive country such as Pakistan.  The different environments and 
friction points make actually utilizing the F3EA targeting process much more difficult in 
the real world. 
 
                                                 
26 Kilcullen, “Countering Global Counterinsurgency,” 604. 
27 Carl Von Clauswitz, On War, trans. Michael Eliot Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1989), 119. 
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As difficult as this is, there is a way to help overcome these real-world challenges.  
We will argue in Chapter VI the method to do this is by establishing a series of globally 
connected fusion nodes that thoroughly understand the operational environment and 
grease potential friction points in order to effectively enable the F3EA targeting process 
to deny, disrupt and defeat transnational terrorist networks.   The next three chapters will 
use historical examples to illustrate how the F3EA targeting process was utilized in 
different operational environments and the different friction points it encountered. 
 18 
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III. LESSONS FROM VIETNAM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
During the Vietnam War, a program that was designed to target Viet Cong 
Infrastructure (VCI) was the Phoenix Program.28  This chapter analyzes aspects of the 
Phoenix Program, and it identifies key lessons that can be applied toward improving the 
effectiveness of current operations targeting the global terrorist network infrastructure of 
al Qaeda and its regional affiliates.  It begins by looking at the background of the Phoenix 
Program, which includes the political context that existed when the Phoenix Program was 
initiated, an overview of the VCI, and the history of the program. This is followed by an 
analysis of how the Phoenix Program conducted the different phases of the Find, Fix, 
Finish, Exploit and Analyze (F3EA) targeting cycle.  From this analysis, the paper 
identifies the friction points encountered by the Phoenix Program, both objective and 
subjective, and how they affected operations.  Objective friction points that affected 
operations included the political environment and resources, while subjective friction 
points included unity of effort and legitimacy.  
B. POLITICAL CONTEXT 
On 22 November 1963, after the assassination of President Kennedy, Lyndon B. 
Johnson assumed the presidency of the United States.  At the time, the U.S. had 
approximately 16,263 military personnel in South Vietnam.29  In 1964, President 
Johnson increased the U.S. military presence in the south to approximately 40,000.30  By 
the end of 1965, he had adopted a military strategy that would deploy an additional 
100,000 military personnel to South Vietnam and included sustained bombing of North 
Vietnamese targets.31  This strategy was not intended to defeat North Vietnam; rather, it 
                                                 
28 William Rosenau and Austin Long, The Phoenix Program and Contemporary Counterinsurgency, 
Research Paper, RAND National Defense Research Institute (Arlington: RAND Corporation, 2009), iii. 
29 Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Shuster, 1994), 653. 
30 George C. Herring, America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975 (New 
York: Wiley, 1979), 146. 
31 Herring, America's Longest War, 150–153. 
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was designed to inflict high costs on North Vietnam for supporting the communist 
insurgency in the South and force the North Vietnamese to negotiate a peace settlement 
acceptable to the United States.32 
Soon after becoming president, Johnson ordered a review of American policy in 
Vietnam.  This review concluded that the United States should continue its existing 
policies in Vietnam, but it should strive to implement its policies more efficiently, and it 
emphasized the importance of an independent, non-communist government in South 
Vietnam.33  As a result of this review, President Johnson approved the objectives 
outlined in National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 288.  The main objectives in 
NSAM 288 were to establish stable political leadership in South Vietnam, to provide 
programs that fostered economic development for the rural population, and to assist in the 
training of a guerilla force to augment the conventional South Vietnamese Army 
(ARVN).34  This policy stressed the importance of self-reliance on the part of the South 
Vietnamese government, and resulted in an immediate $50 million dollar increase in the 
amount of economic aid; it also increased the number of U.S. military advisors from 
16,300 to 23,300.35 
During this same period, significant political and military problems within the 
South Vietnamese government had an impact on the strategy that President Johnson 
pursued.  Less than a month prior to the assassination of President Kennedy, President 
Diem of South Vietnam was assassinated.  Prior to Diem’s assassination, the political 
situation had been steadily deteriorating, and the United States viewed the South 
Vietnamese government as ineffective.  While the United States did not play an active 
role in Diem’s assassination, it is believed they did encourage Diem’s removal with the 
hope that it would improve governance in the South.  However, after Diem’s 
assassination, the political situation became even more chaotic.   
                                                 
32 Herring, America's Longest War, 156. 
33 Herring, America's Longest War, 130. 
34 Guenter Lewy, America in Vietnam (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), 30. 
35 Herring, America's Longest War, 130. 
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In 1964 alone, there were seven different governments in South Vietnam, and 
none of them were viewed as competent or popular among the South Vietnamese 
population; the political situation had gone from bad to critical.  As a result of the 
political chaos, the military situation was also worsening and the Vietcong controlled 
large portions of the population in key areas outside of Saigon.  Additionally, it was 
discovered that the optimistic reports that the Diem regime had been producing about the 
strategic hamlet program were false.  These factors, along with the low morale and 
numerous defeats of the South Vietnamese Army, led the United States to the conclusion 
that South Vietnam would collapse unless the United States increased its role in the 
war.36  
C. THE HISTORY OF THE PHOENIX PROGRAM 
As of 1965, the U.S. Embassy in Saigon controlled the civilian stabilization 
efforts in Vietnam, while Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) controlled the 
military advisor efforts that were focused primarily on training the Republic of Vietnam 
Armed Forces (RVNAF).37  As the efforts to support the Republic of Vietnam’s (RVN) 
pacification program increased, “the embassy began to reach its organizational limits”38 
to run and coordinate the various U.S. civilian agency programs.  In May 1967, in an 
effort to concentrate U.S. support to RVN pacification programs, the office of Civil 
Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) was created under the 
control of MACV.  During this period, included among the various RVN pacification 
programs, was a renewed focus on targeting the VCI.  The effort to target the VCI was 
intended to disrupt and degrade the VC, which would improve security and enable other 
COIN efforts to be more effective.  
Even before the beginning of the Phoenix Program there was a need for improved 
intelligence and operations fusion.  As a result, in June 1967, the Director of CORDS, 
                                                 
36 Lewy, America in Vietnam, 25–28. 
37 Richard W. Stewart, “Chapter 8. CORDS and the Vietnam Experience: An Interagency 
Organization for Counterinsurgency and Pacification,” in Project on National Security Reform Case 
Studies Volume I, 451-481 (Washington DC: Center for the Study of the Presidency, 2008), 454. 
38 Stewart, “Chapter 8. CORDS and the Vietnam Experience,” 454. 
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Ambassador Robert Komer, received approval to establish the Intelligence Coordination 
and Exploitation (ICEX) program, which later became Phoenix.39  Once established, the 
Phoenix Program consisted of two elements.   
The first element was designed to fuse intelligence and operations, and to promote 
intelligence sharing between the various U.S. and South Vietnamese agencies involved in 
the program.  The overall intent was to improve the effectiveness of operations targeting 
the VCI.  The name for the U.S. contribution to this portion of the program was Phoenix, 
while the South Vietnamese contribution was called Phung Hoang, which is the 
Vietnamese name for a mythical bird that resembles a Phoenix.  In order to improve 
coordination, a series of Province Intelligence and Operations Coordination Centers 
(PIOCCs) and District Intelligence and Operations Coordination Centers (DIOCCs) were 
established.  The South Vietnamese provided the majority of the manning for these 
coordination centers, and South Vietnamese personnel came from across a wide spectrum 
of military, civilian, and law enforcement agencies.40  On the U.S. side, the CIA provided 
the majority of advisors at the provincial level, while MACV CORDS provided military 
advisors at the district level; “[b]y 1970, more than 700 [U.S.] advisors were serving in 
Phoenix.”41  Additionally, in their VCI targeting campaign, the program leveraged the 
efforts of other combined U.S./South Vietnamese intelligence organizations, such as the 
Combined Military Interrogation Center, the Combined Document Exploitation Center, 
the Combined Materiel Exploitation Center, and the Combined Intelligence Center 
Vietnam (CICV).  In particular, the CICV contained a Political Order of Battle Section 
that maintained thousands of dossiers on suspected VCI personnel.42 
The second element of the program was the action-arm that targeted the VCI.  
While numerous law enforcement and military agencies within the RVN supported the 
program, the main action-arm element of the program consisted of South Vietnamese 
Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRUs) that were sponsored by the Central Intelligence 
                                                 
39 Rosenau and Long, The Phoenix Program, 7. 
40 Rosenau and Long, The Phoenix Program, 7–8. 
41 Rosenau and Long, The Phoenix Program, 8. 
42 Rosenau and Long, The Phoenix Program, 8–9. 
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Agency (CIA).  The CIA had the primary role of training, paying, and advising the PRUs; 
however, the CIA received support from U.S. Army Special Forces to perform these 
functions.43  In essence, the PRUs were a highly trained, well-equipped and better-paid 
South Vietnamese police force that leveraged detailed intelligence to target the VCI.44  
The majority of PRU members had previous experience in elite South Vietnamese 
military units, and U.S. advisors helped plan and participated in operations.45  Many PRU 
members had also lost family members due to VC violence and were highly motivated in 
their efforts.  Additionally, the PRUs typically operated in their home province, so their 
understanding of the local environment was exceptional, which enabled them to establish 
extensive networks of informants and personal contacts.46   The primary mission of the 
PRUs was to apprehend VC cadre and exploit them for intelligence purposes.47  In the 
words of one American PRU advisor, “prisoner snatches were key.  You can’t get 
information out of a dead man.”48  The PRUs also used their influence to encourage VCI 
personnel to defect.  
D. F3EA AND THE PHOENIX PROGRAM 
As previously stated, currently, the preferred method of targeting insurgent and 
terrorist network infrastructure is F3EA.  This section seeks to determine how the 
functions of F3EA were conducted to target the VCI during the Vietnam War, and to 
identify key lessons that can be applied to the GWOT.  The authors acknowledge that the 
targeting methodology used in the Vietnam War was not specifically referred to as the 
F3EA cycle.  However, under the Phoenix Program, the targeting effort did perform each 
phase of the F3EA cycle.  The following sections will provide an overview of the F3EA 
targeting process and then examine how the Phoenix Program performed them. 
                                                 
43 Rosenau and Long, The Phoenix Program, vii. 
44 Rosenau and Long, The Phoenix Program, 11. 
45 Rosenau and Long, The Phoenix Program, 12. 
46 Rosenau and Long, The Phoenix Program, 11. 
47 Rosenau and Long, The Phoenix Program, 10. 
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1. Find and Fix 
In the find phase, multiple sources of intelligence, such as signals intelligence 
(SIGINT), human intelligence (HUMINT), and imagery intelligence (IMINT), are fused 
to identify critical nodes in the insurgent network for targeting.  Much of the intelligence 
used in this phase is typically generated during the exploit and analyze phases of previous 
operations.  In the find phase, the intent is to find a target among the larger civilian 
population and identify a general operating area for the target; “the most difficult task in 
[combating] insurgencies is finding the enemy.”49  
In the fix phase, again, multiple sources of intelligence are used, but now the 
intent is to generate a detailed picture on the targets pattern of life.  The ultimate goal in 
this phase is to identify the targets exact location at a specific moment in time.  During 
both the find and fix phase detailed information is also being generated on how the target 
fits into the overall network, specifically, the targets role in the network, and who else the 
target interacts with in the network.  At this point, a key decision must be made; should 
the target be removed from the network, or should the target continue to be exploited for 
additional information about the network.50  Often times, it is more beneficial to continue 
to collect intelligence on the target rather than to eliminate the target from the network.  
While not specifically mentioned in the literature, during the find and fix phases, if 
appropriate, efforts can also be applied to encourage the target to defect from the 
insurgent organization.  Defection can be either overt, where the target openly leaves the 
insurgent organization and cooperates with friendly forces, or it can be covert, where the 
target is recruited as a HUMINT source within the insurgent network. 
In order to conduct find and fix operations, the Phoenix Program attempted to 
enhance collaboration between the U.S. and Vietnamese forces and it placed an emphasis 
on using Vietnamese personnel for intelligence collection. The entire intent of the 
Phoenix Program was to improve the effectiveness of VCI targeting by increasing 
collaboration between the U.S. and South Vietnamese, and by increasing interagency 
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collaboration within the South Vietnamese government.  This emphasis on collaboration 
led to the establishment of the PIOCCs and DIOCCs to help develop the detailed 
collection required to find and fix members of the VCI.  MACV Directive 381-41 
specifically states: 
At each level, the designated U.S. ICEX coordinating elements will be 
charged with coordinating and focusing the intelligence and operational 
attack on infrastructure, and with stimulating, energizing, guiding and 
collaborating with the corresponding Vietnamese organizations effort.51   
MACV recognized that in order to be able to find and fix members of the VCI, they 
would need to create intelligence and operations fusion nodes at all levels.  Additionally, 
by assigning PRU teams to their home province, the PRUs were able to establish 
extensive intelligence collection networks that greatly enhanced their ability to find and 
fix targets. 
The Phung Hoang Advisor’s Handbook provides excellent insight into how the 
find and fix phases were accomplished.  According to the handbook: 
Once a suspect VCI is identified (name and VCI position are known) … 
the next step is to develop a VCI Target Folder on the individual; a good 
target folder will enable the cadre to be specifically targeted (you will 
know his habits, contacts, schedules, and modus operandi).52   
As can be seen from the handbook, the first step in the targeting process was to identify a 
potential member of the VCI through existing intelligence.  Once the potential target was 
identified, a target folder was created and the intelligence effort was focused to conduct 
pattern-of-life analysis on the target, identify the larger network, and determine how the 
target fit into that network.  The PIOCCs and DIOCCs placed considerable emphasis on 
identifying and targeting the network as a whole, not just the individual VCI member.   
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This point is emphasized in the handbook, “consistently up-dated organization charts will 
particularly aid in the development of operations to neutralize entire VCI staff elements 
or organizational echelons.”53  
2. Finish 
Once it is determined that a target should be removed from the network, then, the 
process moves into the finish phase.  More emphasis is usually placed on capturing a 
target, because it allows the collection of additional intelligence about the insurgent 
network to be gathered during interrogation operations.54  Additionally, Sensitive Site 
Exploitation (SSE) is also a critical part of finish operations.  SSE consists of gathering 
all electronic equipment, such as cell phones, computers, laptops, PDAs, and other 
devices, as well as any documents and pocket litter that may be found during a finish 
operation.  Items gathered during SSE can provide additional information on the network 
and prove useful during interrogation operations. 
Finish operations were one of the most controversial aspects of the Phoenix 
Program.  Part of the difficulty was related to the status of suspected VCI cadre.  North 
Vietnamese (NVA) and VC military cadre that were members of the VCI received 
Prisoner of War (PW) status under the Geneva Conventions, while civilian members of 
the VCI were considered civil defendants.55  Critics of the Phoenix Program claimed that 
it was “a merciless assassination campaign”56 that represented the excessive violence 
used by U.S. forces; however, assassination was not part of the official Phoenix policy.57  
This is clearly highlighted in MACV Directive 525-36:  
Operations against the VCI include:  the collection of intelligence 
identifying these members, inducing them to abandon their allegiance to 
the VC and rally to the government, capturing or arresting them in order to 
bring them before province security committees for lawful sentencing, and 
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as a final resort the use of military, or police force against them-if no other 
way-of preventing them from carrying on their unlawful activities is 
possible.  Our training emphasizes the desirability of obtaining these target 
individuals alive and of using intelligent and lawful methods of 
interrogation to obtain the truth of what they know about other aspects of 
the VCI.58 
In the finish phase, the Phoenix Program placed an emphasis on encouraging 
defections and attempting to capture targets verses killing them.  This was beneficial 
because debriefing a defector or interrogating a prisoner provided critical intelligence on 
the enemy infrastructure network.  Again, in the finish phase the use of Vietnamese 
forces as the primary action-arm proved to be extremely beneficial.  As a result of their 
detailed knowledge of the operating environment, they were able to conduct highly 
effective finish operations, very rapidly, once a target was found and fixed. 
3. Exploitation and Analysis 
Next the process moves into the exploit and analyze phase.  According to the 
former senior intelligence officer for the Joint Special Operations Task Force in Iraq, 
Major General Michael Flynn, “[e]xploit – analyze is the main effort of F3EA because it 
provides insight into the enemy network and offers new lines of operations.”59  The use 
of analysts from across the numerous intelligence agencies that are part of the 
intelligence community (IC) working in a collaborative environment is critical, because 
these analysts can leverage their unique perspectives and the resources of their parent 
organizations.  It is also key to ensure that any items that were recovered during the SSE 
in the finish phase are thoroughly exploited and the intelligence obtained is rapidly 
disseminated. 
Members of the Phoenix Program understood the importance of exploiting 
actionable intelligence.  MACV Directive 381-41 highlights this point, “[p]rogress and 
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success clearly will depend on a variety of interrelated factors, including … [m]ore 
selective targeting, and timely exploitation of operational intelligence.”60 
In the exploit and analyze phases, the Phoenix Program also provides a key 
lesson.  Collaboration was emphasized in the exploit and analyze phases by leveraging 
the Combined Military Interrogation Center, the Combined Document Exploitation 
Center, the Combined Materiel Exploitation Center, and the Combined Intelligence 
Center Vietnam (CICV).  The intelligence derived from this collaborative approach 
enabled the development of thousands of dossiers on suspected VCI cadre, which then 
generated new targets for the find and fix phases. 
E. FRICTION POINTS 
As described above, while the Phoenix Program did not refer to the targeting 
process as F3EA, the program did perform the same functions as the various phases of 
the F3EA process to target the VCI.  Therefore, an examination of the friction points that 
were encountered by the Phoenix program can provide valuable lessons on how to design 
targeting efforts against the global terrorist network infrastructure of AQ and its affiliates.  
Friction points, as defined in Chapter 1, can be both objective and subjective.  This 
section will examine major friction points is the design of the Phoenix Program that had 
an impact on operations.  Objective friction points that affected operations included the 
political environment and resources, while subjective friction points included unity of 
effort and legitimacy. 
1. Objective Friction Points 
The first objective friction point that impacted the program was the political 
environment in South Vietnam.  Two factors that help to determine a particular states 
ability to deal with a specific challenge are its capabilities and its will.  These factors 
define the political environment.  Ideally, it is best for the U.S. to have a partner that is 
both capable and willing.  However, in the case of Vietnam, as previously mentioned, the 
RVN’s poor performance and limited abilities to deal with the conflict are what prompted 
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President Johnson to drastically increase the presence and role of U.S. forces to prevent a 
total collapse of South Vietnam.  The large increase of U.S. forces actually provided a 
security umbrella that allowed the RVN to renew its efforts “to establish a wide range of 
programs for governmental administration, economic development, regional security, 
refugee control, anti-Viet Cong infrastructure, national police, and other pacification or 
counterinsurgency activities.”61  While during the Vietnam War the U.S. only had to 
operate in a single political environment, due to the global nature of the AQ network, 
worldwide CT operations will have to be tailored to adjust to the political environments 
of numerous host nations with varying levels of capability and will. 
Resources are another objective friction point that impacted the Phoenix Program. 
Personnel, specifically the quality of the advisors, were the main resource that created 
friction for the Phoenix Program.  The more experienced CIA advisors functioned at the 
provincial level.  However, due to the limited resource of CIA personnel, the advisors at 
the district level were military advisors that sometimes lacked experience and the skills 
required to make them effective.62  An excerpt from the Phung Hoang Advisor’s 
Handbook makes it apparent that leaders of the program recognized this problem:  “The 
disadvantages of youth and low rank can be overcome by initial eagerness to learn what 
your counterparts can teach you and by taking action only when you are sure of your 
grounds.”63 In order to compensate, the Phoenix Program established an in-country 
advisors orientation course.  The course was designed to “acquaint both PHUNG 
HOANG Advisors and other personnel with those GVN agencies that support[ed] the 
PHUNG HOANG Program and with the problems encountered within the program.”64 
The orientation course also included a two-day practical exercise to familiarize the 
trainees with DIOCC operations.65  The lesson for global CT operations is clear.  
Personnel need to be experienced and well trained to be effective. 
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2. Subjective Friction Points 
The first subjective friction point is unity of effort.  CORDS, the larger 
organization that encompassed the Phoenix Program, “placed nearly all civilian and 
military interagency assets involved in the pacification struggle under one civilian 
manager – and then subordinated that individual to the military hierarchy as a Deputy 
Commander of Military Assistance Command Vietnam.”66  This allowed the CORD’s 
leadership to conduct centralized planning, coordinate resources more effectively and to 
synchronize the efforts of the various interagency partners under their control.  The 
Phoenix Program attempted to generate this same level of unity of effort by establishing 
the PIOCCs and DIOCCs.  However, while CORDS forced cooperation at the upper 
levels, cooperation at the lower levels was not as effective, especially in the area of 
intelligence sharing.  As a result of interagency rivalries, the various intelligence 
organizations at the PIOCC and DIOCC level often refused to share intelligence.  Unity 
of effort will be an essential element for future CT operations. 
Legitimacy was the friction point that probably had the greatest impact on the 
Phoenix Program.  Two aspects that undermined legitimacy were the extrajudicial aspects 
of the program and the system of metrics used to track the progress of the program.   
The extrajudicial ability to sentence suspected VCI cadre members drew 
significant criticism from some members of the U.S. Congress, which undermined the 
legitimacy of the Phoenix Program.  Once a suspect was captured, he was brought before 
a Province Security Committee (PSC).  The PSC was able to order the “administrative 
detention of those persons reasonably believed to endanger the national security, but 
against whom sufficient evidence for a trial [was] lacking.”67  The committees had the 
authority to sentence suspected VCI cadre to administrative detention, known as “an tri” 
detention.  It was not necessary to prove that an individual broke the national security 
laws of the RVN, it only had to be demonstrated that a “reasonable belief exists that the 
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suspect threatens the national security.”68  Congressional criticism of the program 
focused on the potential for abuses inherent in the “an tri” system.  Members of congress 
were concerned that the U.S. was helping the RVN establish mechanisms for political 
suppression of the South Vietnamese population in which the amount of evidence 
required to detain a person was dangerously low.  An additional area of concern 
highlighted in the congressional testimony was why U.S. forces had to be specifically 
prohibited from conducting assassinations under MACV Directive 525-36.  Members of 
Congress believed that the prohibition to participate in assassinations was proof that the 
RVN was conducting assassinations.69 
Detailed metrics were collected on the number of VCI neutralized under the 
program.  A person was considered neutralized if they were killed, if they defected to the 
government, or if they received a prison sentence greater than one year.70 As part of 
collecting metrics, neutralization quotas were placed on the various units that supported 
the Phoenix Program.  In an effort to meet quotas, it is believed that innocent civilians 
were sometimes arrested.71  It is also possible that the desire to meet neutralization quotas 
caused the PSCs to administer longer detentions, because a detention had to exceed one 
year for a suspected VCI cadre to be considered neutralized. 
F. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has outlined lessons from the Phoenix program that can be applied to 
targeting operations in the GWOT.  Any program that is designed to conduct F3EA 
operations will inevitably encounter friction points.  By examining the friction points 
from the Phoenix Program, the U.S. can design a structure that attempts to eliminate or 
reduce these friction points.  Specifically, the Phoenix Program demonstrates that key 
friction points that must be considered are the political environment, the quality and 
ability of human resources, unity of effort and the legitimacy of any efforts.  Considering 
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the GWOT began on 11 September 2001, any lessons from history that may improve 
overall effectiveness are worth further exploration and consideration. 
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IV. FROM ESCOBAR TO JIATF-SOUTH 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter analyzes aspects of the manhunt for the drug cartel kingpin, Pablo 
Escobar, and the United States subsequent efforts to counter the narco-terrorist and illicit 
drug trafficking problem.  Unlike the campaign in Vietnam, elements of the U.S. national 
security apparatus operated in a sovereign nation that it was not at odds with, and 
operating in conjunction with its security forces, to counter its internal threat.  Within this 
environment, the U.S. elements operated both overtly and covertly under predominantly 
restrictive authorities in order to aid the Government of Colombia’s (GOC) search and 
prosecution of Escobar’s Medellín Cartel.  Like the operations in Vietnam, the U.S. 
utilized a targeting process that also incorporated the efforts of the host nation, in this 
case the various security agencies.  It also identifies key lessons that can be applied 
toward improving the effectiveness of current operations targeting the global terrorist 
network infrastructure of al Qaeda and its regional affiliate.  The chapter begins by 
looking at the background of the U.S. relations in Central and South America following 
WWII, provides an overview of Escobar’s rise to power, and the ensuing fragmentation 
of the cartels after his demise.  This is followed by an evaluation of how the U.S. 
government conducted the different phases of the Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit and Analyze 
(F3EA) targeting cycle relating to the case.  From this analysis, the chapter identifies the 
friction points encountered during the man-hunting mission, both objective and 
subjective, and how the U.S. adopted an interagency approach to counter the later 
challenges that arose.  Objective friction points that affected operations included the 
environment and resources, while subjective friction points included unity of effort, 
legitimacy, and leadership. 
B. BACKGROUND 
In the aftermath of World War II, twenty-two countries in North, Central, and 
South America sought to enhance their partnership and create a system of collective 
security by signing the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance in 1947.  Less 
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than one year later, all but one of these same countries joined to form the Organization of 
American States (OAS) in response to the perceived threat of the spread of 
communism.72  The United States and its OAS partners benefited from these mutually 
beneficial relationships with an enhanced sense of security and through regional and 
economic cooperation.  The effects of these coalition efforts played a role in the 
modernization and professionalization of OAS member states security forces as 
witnessed by U.S. Southern Command observers in the late 1980’s.73  It also created a 
collaborative environment, which enabled U.S. policy makers and defense officials to 
build lasting partnerships in aiding those countries in combating their own internal 
regional problems.74 
One such benefit of OAS relationships came to bear in Colombia, when U.S. 
Department of Defense Special Operations Forces (SOF) assisted host nation forces in 
targeting Pablo Escobar, the cocaine kingpin of the Cartel de Medellín.  This was one of 
the first successful cases in the post-Cold War era that U.S. SOF would test a capability 
often practiced, but rarely put into action, man-hunting.  Unlike the dismal failure to 
capture General Mohammed Farah Aideed in Somalia in the fall of 1993, military liaison, 
working covertly and in conjunction with interagency partners, merged U.S. intelligence 
efforts with those of the Colombian Bloque de Busqueda (Search Bloc) in order to 
enhance their counter-cartel missions.75  The persistence and professionalism of the U.S. 
soldier-diplomats led to a successful finale to the Colombian government’s ultimate 
endeavor, the demise of the “world’s greatest outlaw.”  Although it would take over a 
decade before U.S. SOF would perfect and coin the commonly termed phrase, operators 
in Colombia effectively applied the tenets of the Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, and Analyze 
                                                 
72 Our History: Organization of American States. 2011. http://www.oas.org/en/about/our_history.asp 
(accessed October 2, 2011). 
73 Kenneth, Finlayson, “Colombia: A Special Relationship,” Veritas: Journal of Army Special 
Operations History 2, no. 4 (2006): 5–7. 
74 Chris Kraul,  “Colombia assuming instructor role for other militaries.” www.LATimes.com. March 
6, 2011. http://articles.latimes.com/2011/mar/06/world/la-fg-colombia-mexico-pilots-20110306 (accessed 
March 14, 2011).  Colombian forces are training Mexico and 13 other Latin American and Caribbean 
countries on counter-narcotic missions. 
75 Mark Bowden, Killing Pablo: The Hunt for the World's Greatest Outlaw (New York, NY: Atlantic 
Monthly Press, 2001), 206–208. 
 35 
(F3EA) cycle to target Pablo Escobar while successfully establishing interagency and 
international (joint and combined) fusion of intelligence.76   
As in many cases involving the removal of a key figure in a controversial 
organization, the negative side effects of Escobar’s targeted killing included the 
decentralization and spreading of the Colombian drug industry into hundreds of smaller 
“mini-cartels” that spread from the confines of the nation to become a transnational 
problem.77  To further exacerbate the problem, many of the burgeoning cartels developed 
alliances with destabilizing actors, such as the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de 
Colombia (FARC), in mutually supporting relationships that would provide protection for 
the cartels and a source of income for the FARC.  This exponentially increased the 
difficulty for the Colombian security forces, which quickly spread to other South and 
Central American countries.  Fortunately, the multi-national ties fostered by the OAS, the 
interagency and military partnerships established with the Colombians, and the evolution 
of the Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-South), provided a baseline structure 
for effectively targeting the expanding narco-terrorist network. 
C. THE TARGETING CYCLE 
The search for tangible effects on the “War on Drugs” frustrated U.S. policy 
makers as early as the late nineteenth century.78  As in most cases, targeting a problem 
that is rooted with many variables requires a synergistic approach.  The bi- and multi-
lateral approaches made possible through OAS cooperation created a medium for nations 
to collaborate on approaches to fluid, transnational problems such as the evolving drug 
trade.  However, traditional methods of throwing money at the problem via foreign aid 
packages and security assistance training were not adequately stemming the problem.  As 
this challenge elevated to a national security concern in the mid-1980s, decision makers 
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began seeking additional methods to thwart the lucrative drug trade.  These leaders 
needed something more tangible to target than the billion dollar Colombian cash crop; the 
persona of Pablo Escobar provided this object.   
The act that propelled Escobar into the public spotlight, and brought him to 
national attention, was through his involvement in the Avianca Flight 203 bombing on 27 
November 1989.  This single action thrust him into the cross hairs of the U.S. National 
Security Council as a result of the death of two luckless U.S. citizens onboard.79  It also 
provided the impetus for bi-lateral covert action and enhanced cooperation between the 
Colombian and U.S. governments in a mission to capture or kill, at the time, the most 
famous narco-terror leader in the Americas.  Leading the effort fell into the lap of the 
U.S. Ambassador to Colombia, Morris D. Busby, who instituted a whole-of-government 
approach to targeting Escobar and his cartel.  Under his direction, the USEMB Joint Task 
Force (JTF) and concurrently, the Colombia Task Force, were created to assist in the 
apprehension of Escobar and other members of the Medellín Cartel.80  Components of 
the JTF included elements of the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (FBI), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and SOF Operators all 
merged in an adhocratic fusion cell to aid Colombian security elements.81  Thus began 
“the hunt for the world’s greatest outlaw.” 
1. Find, Fix, and Finish 
Significant to the man-hunting operation to apprehend Escobar was the fact that a 
small element of U.S. SOF Operators was actively and covertly targeting a foreign person 
in the sovereign territory of Colombia.  These conditions would limit the tactical actions 
available; however, Escobar’s threat to the stability of Colombia and the collateral effects 
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of his narco-activities on the U.S. influenced the executive branch to authorize the 
military a more active role in the hunt, which would follow the traditional find, fix, finish 
target cycle.82   
Through signals intelligence (SIGINT), SOF and CIA Operators were able to 
quickly pinpoint the locations of senior Medellín Cartel members, which was then passed 
to officials in the Search Bloc who would, if possible, corroborate the information with 
their human intelligence (HUMINT), and then deploy their security forces to establish a 
perimeter around the target area.83  In theory, isolating the targeted individual in this way 
would enable those same forces to cordon off escape routes and allow the host nation 
capture/kill force to conduct their mission.  In actuality, almost eighteen months passed 
before this force terminated Escobar. 
The vast majority of the challenges attributed to this prolonged hunt are a result of 
Escobar’s penetration of the government, police, and military forces.  This provided him 
an intelligence advantage over his adversaries, which allowed him to elude capture on 
several occasions despite the veracity of the Search Bloc’s intelligence.  Other 
contributing factors included the competency of the Colombian’s fix and finish force, as 
well as its own intelligence failures.  To compete against these shortcomings, the U.S. 
enhanced its FBI and DEA liaison relationships with their Colombian counterparts, often 
resulting in sharing previously restricted intelligence, and deployed additional SOF 
Operators to advise and train the Search Bloc’s finish force.84  The efforts came to 
fruition in early December, 1993, when SIGINT provided the tip that led to Escobar’s 
finish. 
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2. Exploitation and Analysis 
Although operations leading up to Escobar’s death provided a dearth of 
intelligence via interrogations, detainee reports, and material acquired through sensitive 
site exploitation, the coalition relationships and intelligence sharing restrictions often 
inhibited the process of targeting the cartel network.  Each of the security and law 
enforcement elements assigned to targeting Escobar realized the importance of evidence 
collection, which often led to follow-on targeting; however, not all of these organizations 
were created equally.  Many were unofficial paramilitary groups who merely sought 
revenge on Escobar and who the U.S. government could not legally support.85  
Additional shortfalls came from the lack of urgency to exploit the often time-sensitive 
data.  This deficit could be attributed to the competency of the “Finish” force, but also to 
the linear targeting technique that failed to account for the networked structure of the 
Medellín organization, which was a result of incongruences within the bi-lateral 
intelligence fusion.   
Despite the challenges associated with the disparate element’s competencies and 
flaws, the establishment of the Colombian and USEMB Joint Task Force, as well as the 
Government of Colombia’s Search Bloc, was instrumental in the exploitation and 
analysis of the Escobar mission.  Each element, through cooperation and synergistic 
efforts, set the conditions for destabilizing the Medellín network.  These nodes 
incorporated the each of the various agencies responsible for certain aspects of the 
manhunt and fused them into a single entity, which created an environment for better 
intelligence sharing and deconfliction of effort.  This was essential for the exploitation 
and analysis that led on to follow-on targeting to deconstruct the cartel framework. 
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D. FRICTION POINTS 
The entire manhunt operation to apprehend Escobar was rife with friction, both 
objective and subjective in nature.  Within the objective realm, the environmental factors 
included the actual operation area, which fell within the sovereign borders and airspace of 
Colombia, as well as the political realm both within the U.S., between the executive, 
legislative, and judicial, branches, as well as the diplomatic realm between the U.S. and 
Colombian governments.  The lack of open hostilities and no declaration of war limited 
the size and scope of the military package deemed necessary to support the Colombian 
government.  It also limited the activities in which SOF Operators could conduct under 
Title 10 authorities.  However, once the National Security Council determined the actions 
of Escobar’s Medellín Cartel a substantial threat, the authorities to deploy covertly, under 
Title 50, allowed those Operators to conduct intelligence collection activities, as well as 
to serve in an “advise and assist” capacity.  It was incumbent on the Chief of Mission that 
all operations remain transparent since the roles members of his country team were filling 
were controversial in nature to senior leaders in the Colombian government as well as 
with policy makers and the judiciary in the U.S.  Ultimately, the employment of military 
personnel within a sovereign country was a contentious subject for both nations even if 
the mission was primarily to provide and assist in the fusion of intelligence. 
The realm of resources encompassed an additional objective friction point.  As 
foreign monetary aid proved insufficient in assisting the Colombian government in the 
late 1980’s, the U.S. Executive Branch authorized expending additional resources in 
battling the cartels and the drug trade.  With that, greater funding was diverted to the 
DEA, and expanded their, and the FBI’s, role and manpower outside the continental 
United States in the form of liaison staff and legal attachés (LEGAT) operating from 
embassies and consulates.  It would also employ the vastly funded and resourced U.S. 
military, which had an abundance of technical, mechanical, and personnel at its disposal.  
These resources were abundant during the Escobar mission, but suffered on later 
occasions, specifically when they were redirected to assist GWOT operations in 2002.86  
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Eventually, the U.S. government’s willingness to direct adequate assets toward the 
mission was a necessary condition in achieving the initial success against the Medellín 
Cartel while follow on success destabilizing the FARC and other narco-terrorists. 
Several subjective friction points came into play during the Escobar campaign, the 
first being the unity of effort.  Because of the level of attention the problem received at 
the national policy level, and the creation of the Colombian and Joint Task Force, 
interagency actors became less reticent about working together.  The traditional 
boundaries set by institutional norms were overcome by the need to accomplish the 
mission.  Within the country team, a whole-of-government approach was employed to 
bring the full brunt of the elements of national power on the personal of Escobar and later 
transnational drug trafficking.  This is not to say that interagency friction did not occur.  
Since all agencies compete for funding and resources, a certain level of rivalry plagued 
the country team.87  Along with that, the commonplace debates of which intelligence is 
releasable and to who regularly afflicted interagency meetings.  Outside of interagency 
circles, U.S. elements often felt at odds with their host nation counterparts, who did not 
appear to take the same dedicated approach to the problem or invest the same amount of 
effort.  Such hindrances must be overcome in order to achieve effects. 
Legitimacy of the mission was also at stake during the manhunt for Escobar.  As 
previously mentioned, the targeting of General Aideed in Somalia came to national 
attention during the same timeframe as the Colombia mission, and both occurred within 
the first year of President Clinton’s administration.  Although there are few similarities 
between the two cases, the casual observer will see no distinction between the two.  
However, the mission in Colombia was deemed of national security interest, which 
provided the legitimacy for U.S. SOF to operate within the country in an intelligence 
collection capacity and in training the host nation force.  Neither mission would have 
been possible had it not been strictly approved by the President of Colombia, who 
allowed it at the expense of appearing weak to his contenders, providing them material to 
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attack his political administration.  On a broader scale, and a consequential result of the 
fragmentation of the cartels, the effort to counter the expansive drug trafficking problem 
and various insurgencies (FARC, ELN, AUC) is a regional problem, which gives 
legitimacy to JIATF-South’s mission and its coalition efforts against narco-terrorism.  
Without public and diplomatic support by the host nation, the operations will never be 
seen as legitimate. 
The final, yet no less contentious source of friction is that of leadership, which 
plays an essential role in effective counter-network operations.  An individual must have 
the attributes necessary to focus a disparate group of interagency and coalition players 
toward a common goal.  This must also be accomplished at the strategic, operational, and 
tactical levels.  In the Colombia case, President Clinton accomplished the strategic 
approach by balancing relationships and national interests with the Colombian President, 
César Gaviria, as well as the U.S. Legislative Branch.  Operationally, Ambassador Busby 
managed the interagency players on his Country Team as well as the interaction with 
Colombian leaders, specifically Gaviria.  On the tactical level, the various interagency 
players themselves had to effectively lead their peers within the embassy depending on 
their various specialties and their counterparts in the Colombian National Police and the 
Search Bloc.  Presently, elements of JIATF-South fill similar leadership roles, not only 
within the command, but also with various regional actors and their counterparts, proving 
the efficacy of overcoming leadership friction. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Overall, the mission to capture/kill Pablo Escobar contained all of the components 
of the F3EA cycle, incorporated an interagency approach, and increased the bilateral 
cooperation that proved to be essential for achieving positive target-based effects.  
However, it was only a small chapter in the history of United States’ “war on drugs.”  
Four U.S. Presidential Administrations oversaw the genesis of what would become the 
Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) South, which matured during this highly 
romanticized operation.  The nodal approach encompassing the Escobar affair would be 
expanded to encompass a much broader region and mission as the cartels fragmented and 
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merged with transnational insurgencies such as the FARC, Ejército de Liberación 
Nacional (ELN), and Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC).88  JIATF-South would 
be tasked with conducting interagency and international Detection & Monitoring 
operations, facilitating the interdiction of illicit trafficking and other narco-terrorist 
threats in support of national and partner nation security.89  The task force and its 
predecessors adopted a targeting cycle, or End-to-End Mission Management, more robust 
than that what is taught in traditional military courses and is more in line with the F3EA 
process.  It, like the F3EA, is cyclic and is composed of seven steps or stages:  1. Cueing, 
2. Detection, 3. Monitoring, 4. Interdiction, 5. Arrest, 6. Prosecution, which leads to 7. 
More Intelligence.90  Through the utilization of this process, “JIATF-South became the 
model for interagency collaboration as well as a widely cited example of effective 
intelligence fusion.”91 
The collaboration of U.S. and coalition efforts in conducting man-hunting 
missions and narco-terrorist activities in SOUTHCOM’s area of responsibility resulted in 
the destabilization the drug cartels as well as the FARC’s influence in the region.  Each 
operational success, ranging from drug interdictions to aiding in the apprehension of 
cartel leaders, validated the targeting cycle employed, highlighting the importance of 
fusing intelligence with operations and interagency cooperation.  None of which would 
have been possible if not for the decades old relationships built within the OAS.   
This successful collaboration transcended traditional narco-terrorism missions in 
2009 by the successful conclusion of Operation WILLING SPIRIT in U.S. military 
circles and Operation Jaque within Colombia, when fifteen hostages, including three U.S. 
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military contractors, were rescued from FARC captivity.92  Operational effectiveness 
helped break the barriers between various agencies and partner nations, which was 
illuminated when Colombian forces, in conjunction with a small contingent of U.S. 
support personnel, rescued the hostages from their captors, bringing an end to their six 
years in captivity.  The establishment of mission focus nodes consisting of a Joint Task 
Force from SOCSOUTH, interagency actors within the USEMB, and Colombian SOF 
built a collaborative environment to tackle the problem.  By fusing intelligence, plans, 
and operational capability, the fusion nodes brought about the successful end to a multi-
year operation. 
The U.S. can replicate the success of the interagency efforts in Colombia by 
applying the same methods toward the global targeting of terrorist networks through the 
establishment of counter-terrorism (CT) fusion nodes within U.S. embassies and 
consulates.  It is done in Colombia during the Escobar campaign and now, on a regular 
basis, within JIATF-South, which is coined “the model” for interagency activities.  It is 
not an easy task; however, setting the conditions by ensuring the proper authorities are in 
place while establishing a collaborative effort between the interagency and host nation 
forces will lead to the disruption of non-state actors and terrorist networks. 
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V. AL-QAEDA IN IRAQ 
Our operations have, in fact, produced substantial progress against Al 
Qaeda and its affiliates in Iraq.  In the past 8 months, we have 
considerably reduced the areas in which Al Qaeda enjoyed sanctuary.  We 
have also neutralized 5 media cells, detained the senior Iraqi leader of Al 
Qaeda-Iraq, and killed or captured nearly 100 other key leaders and some 
2,500 rank-and-file fighters.  Al Qaeda is certainly not defeated; however, 
it is off balance and we are pursuing its leaders and operators aggressively.  
Of note, as the recent National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq explained, 
these gains against Al Qaeda are a result of the synergy of actions by: 
conventional forces to deny the terrorists sanctuary; intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance assets to find the enemy; and special 
operations elements to conduct targeted raids.  A combination of these 
assets is necessary to prevent the creation of a terrorist safe haven in Iraq. 
GENERAL David H. Petraeus 
Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq 
10–11 September 200793 
 
This chapter will focus on the historical example of the integration of operations 
and intelligence through F3EA targeting cycle as part of the CT efforts against al-Qaeda 
in Iraq (AQI).  This effort was directly in support of overall COIN strategy in Iraq.  
Whereas the previous historical examples discussed on how the targeting cycle overcame 
minor degrees of friction, this chapter will emphasize how friction became a major 
challenge to U.S. CT forces following the implementation of the Status of Forces 
Agreement (SOFA). 
A. BACKGROUND 
On 7 June 2006, two 500-pound laser-guided bombs dropped from American F-
16 fighter-bombers exploded on a safehouse located five miles outside the Iraqi town of 
Baqubah.  After weeks of constant surveillance following the target’s spiritual advisor, 
Task Force 145’s effort had finally paid off.  Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of AQI, 
was now dead.  Shortly after the strike, American Special Operation Forces secured the 
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area and collected a treasure trove of intelligence on the terrorist organization as part of 
the follow-up sensitive site exploitation.  This new information was quickly passed to the 
Task 145 intelligence analysts in order to identify additional AQI associates of al-
Zarqawi.  This group of Special Operations Forces, known as Task Force 145, was 
specially trained and specifically organized to track and then capture or kill High Value 
Targets in Iraq.  Once again, they had just demonstrated how effective they could be 
when operations and intelligence were integrated as part of a deliberate network targeting 
cycle.94 
The airstrike that killed Zarqawi was only a fraction of the effort to find 
and accurately target him. The true operational art behind that strike was a 
multidisciplined intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) 
endeavor coupled with agile SOF that patiently laid bare the Zarqawi 
network and resulted in a find-fix-finish operation. It took more than 600 
hours of ISR to track and observe the network that yielded the target. . . . 
The SOF–ISR combination was effective because it unified operations and 
airborne collections with all other intelligence disciplines under a single 
commander.95 
Their effectiveness only continued to improve.  By May 2007, it was reported that 
American Special Operations Forces were averaging between 6 and 12 missions a night 
against AQI, insurgent fighters and militia targets.96  Although these missions were not 
as high profile as Zarqawi, they demonstrated American’s CT forces had become experts 
at utilizing the F3EA targeting cycle to disrupt, deny and defeat terrorist networks across 
Iraq.  Then in late June 2009, this specialized Task Force and their finely-tuned F3EA 
targeting cycle came to almost grinding halt. 
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On 30 June 2009, the U.S.-Iraq Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) had officially 
taken affect.  As part of the agreement, U.S. combat troops were no longer permitted to 
operate within Iraqi cities and now required Iraqi-approved warrants for individuals 
suspected of terrorist activities.97  In addition, there was increased pressure to start 
including Iraqi forces during finish operations instead of solely Americans troops.  Prior 
to the SOFA, the CT operational environment was one that required little U.S.-Iraqi 
coordination or approval.  U.S. CT forces simply had to decide that they had collected a 
sufficient amount of intelligence and that there was a high probability of capturing or 
killing the target before unilaterally loading up in the helicopters or assault vehicles to 
launch on a finish operation.98  Now, the new operational environment created not just a 
massive increase in the amount of U.S.-Iraqi coordination required during and after a 
raid, but it also required Iraqi approval before starting it.     
U.S. CT forces realized the only way to continue maintaining pressure on AQI 
was by trying to facilitate the F3EA targeting cycle by, with and through the Iraqi 
security forces (ISF).   Heeding the words of Clausewitz, they knew that as easy as this 
sounded on paper, there was going to be a certain degree of friction when it was 
attempted in real war.  Unfortunately, no one was quite prepared for just how much 
objective and subjective friction there would really be, as well as the amount of effort it 
was going to take to try and overcome it.99   While there were countless friction points at 
the tactical, operational and strategic level in the post SOFA Iraq, this chapter will only 
address a few of the major ones in order to highlight the importance and role a fusion 
node can play in facilitating the F3EA targeting process in similar type of operational 
environment. 
                                                 
97 US-Iraq Status of Forces Agreement, 17 November 2008, p. 3-15. 
http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/world/20081119_SOFA_FINAL_AGREED_TEXT.pdf. 
98 Thom Shanker, “Special Operations: High Profile, but in Shadow,” The New York Times, 29 May 
2007, accessed 29 September 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/29/world/middleeast/29forces.html?ref=abumusabalzarqawi. 
99 Anonymous Special Operations Soldier. 
 48 
C. FUSION NODES 
In an effort facilitate the targeting cycle and reduce friction, the U.S. CT Task 
Force decided to stand-up several Fusion Nodes across Iraq.  These nodes were based on 
the previously used principle of Fusion Cells, which had been established to work in 
conjunction with U.S. general purpose forces in Iraq to synchronize CT efforts.  The idea 
was that with a little tweaking, Fusion Nodes would be able to accomplish the same thing 
with the ISF.  On paper, the concept looked easy; however, in reality they immediately 
encountered unforeseen subjective friction.    
The first and most important one involved the F3EA targeting process itself.  As a 
general rule, an understanding of targeting as a cycle did not exist within the ISF, and the 
parts of it that did, where too slow to facilitate a pro-active approach.100  Attempts to 
educate the ISF seemed to make very little headway because it was hard to change their 
hierarchical targeting mindset.  An example of this is apparent when in August 2009, the 
Iraqi Ninawa Province Operations Center senior intelligence officer provided the Mosul 
Fusion Node with a spreadsheet containing 400 targets in numbered order.  When asked 
about the relationship of each target to one another, the Iraqi intelligence officer simply 
answered, “They are all bad.”101  This response clearly indicated a piece-meal targeting 
mentality rather than any sort of integrated network targeting strategy.         
In addition to the difficulty of instilling a network targeting mentality, the second 
significant subjective friction point involved the actually location of the Fusion Nodes.  
The Fusion Nodes were to be embedded within the Iraqi Provincial Operational Centers 
based on the belief that this was a critical hub for information and command and control.  
This belief was based on the American military model where information freely and 
quickly flowed up and down chain-of-command at centralized command and control 
centers.  At this location, the Node would be able to share intelligence, synchronize 
assets, and coordinate operations using a robust communications architecture.   While this 
idea fit well with current American military thinking, and a considerable amount of 
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money and resources were spent trying to turn the operational centers into mirror images 
of American tactical and joint operations centers equipped with computers and flat screen 
TVs, there was little return on this investment because of cultural factors.  The attempts 
to facilitate network targeting by embedding at the provincial operational level netted 
little to no results.  According to one U.S. CT officer: 
The information I provided, or feedback I asked for to kick-start the 
targeting cycle seemed to get lost in a “black hole.”  My assessment for 
this is that the inherent mindset of the ISF did not encourage rapid vertical 
and horizontal information sharing, which is the critical component for 
successful network targeting.  I surmise some of the reasons for this were:  
• Operational level commanders did not want to share information 
with their subordinates because information is power 
• Operational level commanders did not trust my information 
• Subordinate commanders did not trust the information because 
they did not know where it came from 
• The ISF communication process at the operational level was too 
slow to effectively facilitate the information flow 
• Operational level commanders simply choose to ignore my 
information because they knew I had no way to confirm if it was 
indeed passed down to the tactical level102 
As a general rule, the Iraqi military mindset was not conducive to freely sharing 
information up and down the chain of command like it is in the U.S. military.  An 
important reason for is that during the Saddam Hussein Regime, not only was 
information a tool that could be used to protect a police or military officer in the case of 
blackmail, but it also could easily cost him his life in the form of repercussions if an 
operation was conducted and the information was wrong.   One way to overcome this 
“black hole” effect was implemented in the Diyala Province in April 2010.  Once the 
Fusion Node no longer embedded itself at the Diyala Operations Center and instead 
established a direct relationship and gained trust with the tactical level commanders that 
were involved with the actual CT operations (in this case the Federal Police and the 
Major Crimes Unit) the targeting process significantly improved.  This new relationship 
enhanced the speed of the ISF targeting cycle by quickly facilitating the sharing of 
intelligence, leveraging any available resources and gaining immediate feedback.  It even 
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included the ISF willingly handing over sensitive site exploitation material that was 
recovered during unilateral ISF missions.103  Although this arrangement in Diyala  
improved CT targeting in the post SOFA Iraq, it did not eliminate friction all together.  In 
order to better understand the remaining friction points, it is better to examine them 
through the actual F3EA targeting cycle. 
D. FIND 
The ISF lacked the technical means, such as signal intelligence, that was readily 
available to U.S. CT forces to find targets.  This resulted in the ISF solely relying on their 
human intelligence (HUMINT) network to find their targets.  While HUMINT is one 
method to find a target, it is often slow because of the dense population centers in Iraq.  
In addition, the robust road system enabled a target to rapidly travel around the country.  
Due to the need for the targeting cycle to be hours instead of days, often HUMINT alone 
was not fast enough to capitalize on the government’s brief information advantage over 
the insurgency following a successful CT operation.  In order to overcome this obvious 
objective friction point, U.S. CT forces leveraged the Fusion Nodes to take intelligence 
gathered by U.S. collection assets and then make it Iraqi-Releasable.  Then the Fusion 
Nodes would assist the ISF in focusing their HUMINT to a particular area where the 
target was known to be operating.  This action decreased the amount of time it took to 
move to the next phase of the targeting cycle. 
E. FIX 
A second area where objective friction was present was during in the fixing phase 
of the targeting cycle.  As mentioned in chapter one, the critical component of this phase 
is actually locating the target in order to gain information about the individual’s pattern of 
life (PoL), as well as any other potential associates of the network.  U.S. CT forces 
utilized a combination of HUMINT and surveillance aircraft to accomplish this.  
Unfortunately, the ISF lacked surveillance aircraft, and therefore, relied solely on 
HUMINT.  In an effort to reduce the objective friction caused by lack of Iraqi ISR, 
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Fusion Nodes attempted to integrate U.S. Full Motion Video (FMV) assets to assist the 
ISF in tracking a targeted individual.  Unfortunately, even with coaching and mentoring 
by the Fusion Node, this resulted in only limited success because of subjective friction.  
The reason was the ISF leadership often lacked the tactical patience required to develop 
the targeted individual’s PoL and associates prior to executing the third phase of the 
targeting cycle.104 
F. FINISH  
U.S. CT forces in Iraq demonstrated an extremely high level of tactical patience 
waiting for the appropriate trigger to be met before executing a finish operation.  This 
trigger was typically based on an established set of criteria such as HUMINT or FMV 
that produce a high degree of confidence that the targeted individual was present in a 
specific location and there was a high probability of capturing or killing him.  In order to 
accomplish this, U.S. CT forces relied on constant surveillance of the targeted individual.  
As previously mentioned, the ISF lacked the ISR support to help do this so they solely 
relied on HUMINT to tell them when and where a target was located.  Unfortunately, 
often as soon as the ISF would get a report from one of their sources that a target was 
located somewhere they would roll out the gate to try and capture him.  They did little to 
confirm that their source remained in a position to keep constant surveillance on the 
target to ensure he did not flee the area prior to assault force getting there.  More times 
than not, this resulted in the failure to capture the targeted individual.105   The Fusion 
Nodes attempted to overcome this objective friction by utilizing U.S. FMV assets to 
assist the ISF in meeting trigger, but again this was met with only limited success for 
same reason as during the Fix phase, a lack of ISF tactical patience.   As was previously 
discussed in chapter one, the effect of these unsuccessful ISF CT finish operations meant 
that the time available to conduct COIN was continuously being reduced. 
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G. EXPLOITATION  
By 2009, U.S. CT forces in Iraq had become experts at conducting detailed 
searches for sensitive material and good tactical questioning of detainees while still on 
the target objective.  However, the post SOFA operational environment meant that the 
majority, and in many cases all site exploitation was to be conducted by the ISF.  
Unfortunately, this brought about a degree of subjective friction.  The reason was the ISF 
were not experienced or willing to conduct detailed searches and tactical questioning 
while still on the site.  ISF CT operations typically seemed to be a race to see how fast 
they could grab the targeted individual, throw him in a truck and drive back to the base 
without ever conducting any exploitation.106  Fusion Nodes attempted reduced this 
friction by constantly emphasizing to the ISF leadership that the mission is not over just 
because the target individual was killed or captured.  In order for the mission to be a 
success, a detailed exploitation of the site to gain information about the network had to be 
conducted.107    
Often, exploitation provided time sensitive intelligence that was quickly acted up 
and resulted in further degradation of the targeted network.  U.S. CT forces could quickly 
get approval for these follow-on targets because of instantaneous communication with 
higher headquarters.  This was not the case with the ISF.  Typically, the ISF were hesitant 
to conduct time sensitive follow-on missions because of a lack of prior approval from 
their chain-of-command and the lack of a legal search warrant.  The Diyala Fusion Node 
attempted to overcome this subjective friction by establishing a means to gain immediate 
permission from ISF the chain-of-command, as well as the ability to get legal approval 
from an Iraqi judge.  The method to this was by telling the approving commander and the 
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throughout the entire operation.  Unfortunately, this was not always effective because of 
poor cell phone coverage or the commander or judge simply failed to answer the 
phone.108   
Finally, the last form of friction encountered during exploitation was objective 
friction.  The ISF also lacked the technical means available to U.S. CT forces that were 
required to conducted in-depth exploitation of key electronic items recovered on an 
objective.  This meant the ISF were unable to gather critical information about the 
network contained within these devices.  In an effort to overcome this friction, U.S. CT 
forces attempted to utilize the Fusion Nodes as means to collect electronic items from the 
ISF.  Once collected, these items were sent to U.S. technical exploitation facilities within 
Iraq as quickly as possible.  Once the item was exploited, the Fusion Node would put the 
information in the form of an Iraqi Releasable intelligence report and disseminated it 
back to the ISF.  Since the ISF were receiving intelligence from these items, they became 
much more willing to continue passing along them to the Fusion Nodes.109  In addition, 
this exchange provided a means for American CT intelligence analysts to gain access to 
technical devices that were previously unavailable for exploitation. 
H. ANALYSIS  
U.S. CT forces in Iraq relied on a massive pool of intelligence analysts to sift 
through the collected intelligence data.  This enabled them to quickly identify additional 
members or associates of the targeted network.  Unfortunately, U.S. CT forces 
encountered objective friction when they attempted to implement this phase of the 
targeting cycle to the ISF.  The reason for this was ISF CT units lacked a dedicated pool 
of analysts; therefore, their ability to piece together information regarding the network 
was either non-existent or extremely slow.  An effort to overcome this friction was made 
in places like Diyala Province in April 2010.  The Fusion Node there emphasized the 
need for the ISF commanders and intelligence officers to develop products such as a link 
analysis chart to assist in identifying and understanding connections within the network.  
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The intent of this type of analysis was that it would assist the ISF in speeding up the 
amount of time it took to start the targeting cycle over again.110 
I. CONCLUSION 
U.S. CT experience in Iraq demonstrated that the F3EA targeting cycle was a very 
effective method to deny, disrupt and defeat terrorist networks.  As American CT forces 
transitioned from unilateral operations to SOFA environment, the need to assist the ISF in 
maintaining pressure against terrorist networks became increasingly apparent.  In an 
effort to overcome the friction associated with ISF network target, U.S. CT Task Force 
established a series of Fusion Nodes across Iraq.  While there were many lessons to be 
learned once the Fusion Nodes were actually put into practice, they did increase the speed 
and efficiency of ISF network targeting.  They also provided the means for American CT 
legitimacy and a level of American visibility on the terrorist networks operating within 
the post SOFA Iraq.  Despite the multifaceted problems these nodes in Iraq experienced, 
we are confident that they provide a starting point of designing a global CT network that 
is capable of effectively integrating intelligence and operations as part of a precision 
targeting process. 
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VI. APPLICATION 
Terrorism will remain at the forefront of our national security threats over 
the coming year.  Al-Qaida continues to aspire to spectacular attacks. Over 
the past two years, core al-Qaida has continued to be committed to high-
profile attacks against the West, including plans against the United States 
and Europe.  In light of the loss of experienced personnel, we judge it will 
seek to augment sophisticated plots by increasing its operational tempo 
with smaller, simpler ones to demonstrate its continued relevance to the 
global jihad. 
James R. Clapper 
Director of National Intelligence 
10 February 2010111 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate the critical role a series of 
interconnected Fusion Nodes can play in integrating intelligence and operations in order 
to deny, disrupt and defeat transnational terrorism.  It will do this by using recent real-
world events as a foundation to build a hypothetical scenario that highlights the role and 
capabilities of these Fusion Nodes. 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In the early hours of Sunday morning, the sound of a large explosion echoed 
across the Algerian city of Tizi-Ouzou.   The explosion that wounded 33 people, 
including 11 police officers, was caused by a car bomb outside of a police station.112  
Although, no group immediately claimed responsibility for the blast, it was widely 
suspected that the city, located  only 62 miles east of the capital Algiers, had just been the 
victim of another attack by the Algeria-based Sunni Muslim jihadist group Al Qaeda in 
the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).    
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AQIM, an internationally recognized terrorist organization, has two goals.  The 
first is to overthrow the Algeria government in order to establish an Islamic caliphate 
state.  The second is to attack western interests to support Al Qaida’s goal of expelling 
Western influence from Muslim countries.  This second goal was made glaringly clear 
when the leader of AQIM declared, “Everyone must know that we will not hesitate in 
targeting it [America] whenever we can and wherever it is on this planet.”113   This real-
world event, which occurred on 14 August 2011, as well as the goals of AQIM provide 
an excellent foundation to build a “what if” scenario based on what might happen if 
similar attack occurred and after series of Fusion Nodes were established across the 
globe. 
B. HOBOKEN, NEW JERSEY 
It was almost 9 PM when the dark blue Toyota 4Runner finally backed into the 
driveway of the house.  Three men got out of the vehicle, walked up to the door, and after 
a quick knock, were hurried inside.  For the men of the F.B.I. Counter-Terrorism unit 
covertly watching outside, trigger had just been met and the finish phase of the operation 
was about to commence.  Within minutes, F.B.I. agents assisted by local police raided the 
house and detained four men.   During the search of the premises, they discovered eight 
full propane tanks, several initiating devices, and multiple electronic devices.  These 
items were quickly secured and sent back to the lab for analysis.  Another terrorist attack 
against New York City had been disrupted and an al-Qaeda IED cell had just been 
defeated.  However, this success did not happen by chance, but rather by a series of 
earlier interconnected events that were made possible by a Fusion Node more than two 
years ago. 
C. JFK AIRPORT, NEW YORK CITY: ONE MONTH EARLIER 
After several hours of questioning, the 27 year old Malian national had just 
confessed to F.B.I. officials that he was supposed to meet with an American who lived in 
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Hoboken, New Jersey.  In the hopes of a reduced sentence, the Malian confessed that he 
had been communicating with an individual via email after meeting him on an Islamic 
chatroom more than a year ago.  The Malian stated the American claimed he was part of 
an al-Qaeda cell that was planning an attack at the site of the new World Trade Center, 
but needed help making detonators for the bomb.  The Malian had volunteered to fly to 
New York to help.  When he applied for a tourist visa in Mali, his information was 
entered into a U.S. biometric database.  The report came back stating the man had been 
detained in Mali two years ago for weapons smuggling and was also associate with a 
known AQIM VBIED facilitator.  U.S. officials, working with the Joint Interagency Task 
Force (JIATF) located in the National Capital Region, decided to approve the visa.  This 
was all based on the idea that it would bring him under U.S. jurisdiction for questioning 
about his involvement in an incident in Mali two years earlier. 
D. MALI: 2 YEARS EARLIER 
During a routine meeting with a Malian security forces commander, the Officer in 
Charge (OIC) of the Mali Fusion Node received information about four military aged 
males that were recently detained after trying to smuggle weapons and a bag of circuit 
boards through a military border checkpoint.  The OIC asked the security forces 
commander if he could get biometrics on the individuals to check if they might have been 
involved in any known nefarious activity in the past.  The Fusion Node OIC was taken to 
the holding facility and one at time, each detainee was brought out.   Using a Handheld 
Interagency Identity Detection System (HIIDE), the OIC quickly took pictures of each 
detainee’s irises, facial features and fingerprints.  Then, he walked outside, attached the 
HIIDE to a Bgan satellite antenna and bursts the information to a military biometric 
database.  This database, known as the Automated Biometric Information System, is 
accessible to American military forces across the globe through a set of portable consoles 
such as the HIIDE. 114  Within three minutes, an initial report came back stating that one 
of the detainee’s biometric data had been previously entered into the database.  The OIC 
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informed the Malian security force commander of the initial results and stated he would 
provide more detailed information after he was sent the full report.  The OIC returned to 
his office located in the U.S. Embassy, and within four hours received the full report.  It 
stated that the detainee’s fingerprints had been identified on a circuit board that was 
recovered during an AQIM VBIED attack in neighboring Algeria.  The OIC, who was a 
qualified Foreign Disclosure Officer, declassified the report and called the security force 
commander to setup a hasty meeting.   He then called the Fusion Node in Algeria to let 
them know what he had found.  The bomber maker, an Algeria national and an admitted 
member of AQIM, was quickly extradited back to Algeria for prosecution.  
Unfortunately, his three associates, all Malians, disassociated themselves from the AQIM 
member, claimed their innocence and were eventually released.  On the positive, all of 
their biometric data was now part of the American database.  None of this would have 
occurred had it not been for the Fusion Node in Algeria. 
E. ALGERIA: 5 MONTHS EARLIER 
As the vehicle pulled up to the military barracks checkpoint in the Algerian 
coastal town of Cherchell, the driver, dressed in a Lieutenant Colonel Algerian military 
uniform to help avoid suspicion, mutter “Allahu Akbar” to the guard and pressed the 
button.  The vehicle exploded with a thunderous roar.  The attack, which killed 18 
people, could have been worse.  Fortunately, a portion of the car did not detonate, and its 
pieces were scattered around the area.   Upon hearing of the attack, the OIC of the 
Algeria Fusion Node accompanied Algerian security forces to the blast site to facilitate 
exploitation.  A through search uncovered part of an electrical circuit board that as part of 
the initiating device.  Having been instructed on the importance of site exploitation by the 
Fusion Node, Algerian security forces carefully collected, tagged and documented the 
circuit board.  The security forces commander then provided the circuit board to the 
Fusion Node OIC to facilitate further technical exploitation.   The Fusion Node took the 
circuit board, packaged it up and sent it off to the American Joint IED Defeat 
Organization (JIEDDO) exploitation lab.  After further analysis, the lab identified a set of 




Although this scenario is hypothetical, it highlights several key points of why 
Fusion Nodes are critical.  First, had there not been a Fusion Node in Algeria to collect 
the initial circuit board, it is unlikely the AQIM VBIED facilitator would have never been 
identified after being detained in Mali.  Second, this information led to the Mali Fusion 
Node identifying the associates of the AQIM VBIED facilitator as potential AQIM 
members.   This information enabled the identification of a potential AQIM member 
attempting to enter the U.S. two years later.  This identification enabled F.B.I agents to 
find, fix, and finish an American born al-Qaeda cell and prevent an attack.  Lastly, it 
demonstrates how Fusion Nodes can provide the U.S. government a joint-interagency 
means to integrate operations and intelligence with its allies and host-nations partners on 
a global scale to proactively disrupt, deny and defeat transnational terrorist networks. 
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APPENDIX:  THE DESIGN OF THE FUSION NODE 
Decentralized organizations can be so resilient that it’s hard to affect their 
internal structure.  Thus, if you can’t beat them, join them.  The best 
opponent for a starfish organization is often another starfish. 
The Starfish and the Spider115 
The purpose of this appendix is to analyze the critical components and criteria 
necessary to develop and organizational design effective Fusion Nodes that are capable of 
integrating intelligence and operations as part of a network targeting process. 
A. STAKEHOLDERS 
Before going out and creating a series of Fusion Nodes across the globe, it is 
critical to identify all of the stakeholders, as well as the roles and responsibilities they 
might have in one.  In order to do this, it is first necessary to define the term stakeholder.  
For the purpose of this thesis, a stakeholder is any entity inside or outside of the 
organization who: has a vested interest in counterterrorism operations, will be affected by 
the counterterrorism strategy implemented by the Fusion Node, or is in a position to 
effect the adoption or execution of the Fusion Node’s counterterrorism strategy.116  To 
put it more simply, a stakeholder is any entity inside or outside of the Fusion Node “upon 
whose action the organization depends or who in turn depends on the organization for the 
realization of some of its goals [and] objectives.”117 
Based on the stakeholder definition presented above, it becomes evident that the 
number of government stakeholders when conducting counterterrorism operations is 
numerous.  However, in the case of the operations and intelligence Fusion Node, the 
number of government stakeholders be reduced from the larger counterterrorism 
community, since the primary function of the Fusion Node described in this paper is to 
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conduct counterterrorism operations outside of the continental United States (OCONUS) 
and outside of the battlefields of Afghanistan and Iraq. 
At the very top of the list of government stakeholders is the President of the 
United States and the National Security Council (NSC). The President works with the 
NSC to receive the assessments and analyses from the various U.S. government agencies, 
which are then used to create, implement and monitor the national security strategies and 
policies of the United States, including counterterrorism.  While the NSC has a basic 
structure that is mandated by law, the actual structure of the NSC is defined by each 
presidential administration according to the President’s priorities and guidance.  Under 
President Obama, the NSC consists of the President, Vice President, Secretary of State, 
Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Energy, Secretary of Treasury, Attorney General, 
Secretary of Homeland Security, the Representative of the United States of America to 
the United Nations, Chief of Staff to the President, National Security Advisor, Director of 
National Intelligence, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.118 
Within the NSC there are the Principals Committee, the Deputies Committee, and 
the Interagency Policy Committees.  The Principles Committee consists of the cabinet 
members who are part of the NSC, and it is responsible for addressing critical national 
security issues and overseeing policy implementation.  The Deputies Committee consists 
of the sub-cabinet members (deputy secretaries), and it is responsible for process 
coordination between the NSC, the Principles Committee and the various Interagency 
Policy Committees.  The Interagency Policy Committees are responsible for policy 
development and execution for various regional and functional areas.  The three Policy 
Committees that impact counterterrorism are the committee for Counterterrorism and 
National Preparedness (also known as the Counterterrorism Support Group); the 
committee for Defense Strategy, Force Structure, and Planning; and the committee for 
Intelligence and Counterintelligence.119  See Figure 1 for a graphic representation of the 
role of the NSC and the committees. 
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Figure 5.   Role of NSC and Committees. 120 
Below the President and the NSC there are the U.S. government agencies that are 
government stakeholders in OCONUS counterterrorism operations.  They include the 
Department of State (DoS), the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of the 
Treasury (Treasury), the Department of Justice (DoJ), and the Office of the Director for 
National Intelligence (DNI).121 
The DoS is a major stakeholder and has the lead responsibility for 
counterterrorism efforts OCONUS.  As a result, it has numerous elements that perform 
counterterrorism roles, which include: the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS); the 
Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR); the Bureau of International Narcotics and 
Law Enforcement; the Bureau for International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN); the  
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Counterterrorism Finance Unit; the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism 
(S/CT); the Office of Terrorism Finance and Economic Sanctions Policy; and the Public 
Designation Unit.122 
Within DoS the main element for counterterrorism is S/CT.  The central role of 
S/CT is explained on the DoS website: 
The mission of the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT) 
is to develop and lead a worldwide effort to combat terrorism using all the 
instruments of statecraft: diplomacy, economic power, intelligence, law 
enforcement, and military. S/CT provides foreign policy oversight and 
guidance to all U.S. Government international counterterrorism 
activities.123 
The DS also plays a major role in counterterrorism within the DoS.  It has 
responsibility for the Antiterrorism Assistance Program and the Rewards for Justice 
Program.  The Antiterrorism Assistance Program helps establish cooperative 
relationships between U.S. law enforcement agencies and organizations with similar roles 
within partner nations conducting counterterrorism operations.  The Rewards for Justice 
Program offers rewards to individuals who provide information that solves or prevents 
terrorist acts.  It also provides rewards for information that leads to the capture or 
conviction of terrorists.124 
As mentioned above, there are several other DoS bureaus that also have various 
counterterrorism roles.  The INR is a member of the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) 
and has the responsibility of providing intelligence on global terrorist threats for the DoS. 
The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement develops policies and 
programs to address international drug trafficking and crime that may have an impact on 
terrorist organizations.  The ISN is responsible for developing efforts to prevent the 
spread of weapons of mass destruction among terrorist groups and non-state actors.  The 
Counterterrorism Finance Unit works with the Public Designation Unit to identify 
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terrorist financial support structures and eliminate them.  The Public Designation Unit is 
responsible for recommending to the Secretary of State the organizations and individuals 
that should be formally identified as terrorists, and also monitors to ensure that sanctions 
are being enforced for those individuals and organizations on the list.  Lastly, the Office 
of Terrorism Finance and Economic Sanctions Policy works to establish international 
support for initiatives that target terrorist financing.125 
The next major stakeholder is the DoD.  Similar to the DoS, within the DoD there 
are also numerous elements that are involved in counterterrorism efforts, such as:  the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations, Low-Intensity Conflict and 
Interdependent Capabilities (ASD/SOLIC & IC); the United States Special Operations 
Command (USSOCOM); the Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCC); the Defense 
Intelligence Agency (DIA); the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA); the 
Military Department Intelligence Services; the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency 
(NGA); the National Security Agency (NSA); and the National Reconnaissance Office 
(NRO).126 
The main DoD entities that are involved with conducting counterterrorism 
operations are ASD/SOLIC & IC, USSOCOM, and the six GCCs.  The ASD/SOLIC & 
IC is responsible to the SECDEF for all matters relating to special operations and low-
intensity conflict, which includes counterterrorism.127  According to the 2008 Unified 
Command Plan (UCP), USSOCOM “is responsible for synchronizing planning for global 
operations against terrorist networks, and will do so in coordination with other combatant 
commands, the Services, and, as directed, appropriate U.S. government agencies.”128  
The six GCCs are NORTHCOM, PACOM, EUCOM, SOUTHCOM, CENTCOM, and 
AFRICOM.  Within the 2008 UCP it also states, “[u]nless otherwise directed, the 
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geographic combatant commanders are responsible for missions in their AORs.”129  This 
includes counterterrorism operations, unless directed otherwise. 
There are also the various DoD intelligence organizations, which are part of the 
IC, and the DSCA that have roles in counterterrorism operations.  The DIA provides a 
wide-range of intelligence support to DoD, which includes the Joint Intelligence Task 
Force for Combating Terrorism that consolidates terrorism related intelligence for DoD.  
The Military Department Intelligence Services are the intelligence organizations that are 
organic to the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps.  They focus on the intelligence 
requirements of their specific service.  The NGA provides geospatial intelligence, which 
includes imagery, to assist decision makers and commanders planning and conducting 
operations.  The NRO is responsible for space based intelligence collection, and works 
closely with other interagency partners within the IC.  The NSA is the agency responsible 
for national signals intelligence and information assurance.  The NSA plays a large role 
in supporting counterterrorism operations.  The DSCA directs and manages security 
cooperation programs and is a hub for interagency coordination.130 
The Treasury identifies and targets financial networks that sustain terrorism and 
has several elements that are involved in counterterrorism operations.  The Office of 
Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is responsible for managing and enforcing sanctions.  
The Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence is responsible for synchronizing 
terrorism related intelligence and enforcement within the Treasury.  In addition, the 
Office of Intelligence Analysis (OIA) is part of the TFI and provides intelligence related 
to terrorist financial support networks and other threats.131 
The DNI is the head of the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) and is the primary 
intelligence advisor to the President and the NSC. The National Counterterrorism Center 
(NCTC) is part of the DNI.  The NCTC is responsible for intelligence support designed to 
counter transnational terrorist threats, and it includes analysts from over 16 organizations.  
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The CIA is a member of the IC and reports directly to the DNI.  The CIA has a primary 
focus on national level human intelligence collection operations.  See figure 2 for a chart 
on the IC. 
 
Figure 6.   The Intelligence Community (IC) 132 
The DoJ also has a counterterrorism role and includes the Drug Enforcement 
Agency (DEA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).  The DEA is part of the IC 
and focuses on threats from drug traffickers and global terrorist networks.  The FBI is the 
lead U.S. government agency for domestic counterterrorism, but also works 
internationally to combat terrorism.133 
The U.S. Country Team for a particular country is also a stakeholder.  According 
to the SOF Counterterrorism Reference Manual: 
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Led by the U.S. Ambassador or Chief of Mission (COM), the Country 
Team serves as the multifaceted “face” of the USG interagency process.  
The Country Team is made up of USG representatives who are placed on 
the ground to ensure the successful functioning of the programs 
administered by their parent departments, agencies and organizations.  The 
COM has the discretionary authority to organize her Country Team in 
whatever fashion she sees fit. 
Members of the Country Team include:  the Chief of Mission, Deputy 
Chief of Mission, Consul General, Economic Counselor, Management 
Counselor, Political Counselor, Political-Military Officer, Narcotics 
Control Officer, Public Affairs Officer, Regional Security Officer, 
Community Liaison Officer, USAID Representative, Defense Attaché, 
Commercial Counselor, Security Assistance Officer, Legal Attaché, 
Resident Legal Advisor, Political and Economic Section Chief, Treasury 
Attaché, Immigration and Customs Enforcement Attaché, Agricultural 
Attaché, Drug Enforcement Attaché, Aviation Attaché, Peace Corps 
Director, Office of Regional Affairs, and NCOIC USMC Security 
Detachment.134 
In addition to the U.S. government, traditional U.S. allies and host nation partners 
are also stakeholders.  However, due to the each of these countries having their own self-
interest, as well as uniqueness of each location, their stakeholder interests will not be 
covered in this thesis.  It is critical to keep this in mind when examining the environment 
the Fusion Node will operate in. 
B. STRATEGY AND PURPOSE  
President Obama’s 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS), provides his Geo-
Political and economic vision for the U.S.  The policy guidelines set forth by the NSS 
allow the Secretary of Defense to align essential political-military strategic objectives and 
design the National Defense Strategy (NDS).135  The president use of “align essential 
political-military” is the foundation that ensures interagency manpower, financial and 
collection resources allocated to a Fusion Node.  Secretary Gates remarked that the new 
NDS is a balance between sustaining our force superiority and the need for cutting-edge 
capabilities to prevail against a persistent and emerging asymmetric or irregular 
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adversary.136  The NSS and NDS reflect the need for a strategic approach that can evolve 
and adapt in response to a changing security environment. The current battlefield 
encompasses air, sea, land and space challenges: violent extremist movements, 
transnational organized crime, rouge states, the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD), rising regional powers, emerging and failed states, resource 
conflicts, cyber-warfare, etc…  The desired end state and goals are derived from the 
unit’s next higher Agency headquarter, as well as Task Force Commanders Intent and 
Mission statement.  The operational plan is aligned with theater campaign plans and 
synchronized with DoD National Defense Strategy.  Understanding U.S. DoS and DoD 
strategy and purpose is important when evaluating the best environments to establish 
Fusion Nodes to maximize their performance capabilities. 
C. STRUCTURE 
In recent years, al Qaeda and its affiliated terrorist movements have developed a 
“less centralized command and control, (with) no clear center of gravity, and likely rising 
and falling centers of gravity, (dependent) on where the U.S. and the International focus 
is for that period.”137  They have adopted a social network spanning 70 countries, 
incorporating modern communications to expand their influence even further, and 
diversified their modus operandi to include less sensational attacks albeit not less 
deadly.138  These small networks and associated nodes have contributed to the 
globalization of terrorist activity across both time and space resulting in a complex and 
unstable environment for the international community.   
In order to effectively combat this threat, the U.S. must adopt an approach similar 
to that which is being utilized by the specific terrorist network in each region.  This holds 
true to Ivan Arreguín-Toft’s hypothesis that “same-approach interactions—whether 
direct-direct or indirect-indirect—favor strong actors because they imply shared values, 
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aims, and victory conditions” as those of their opponents, in this case, non-state, terrorist 
actors.139  Strong actors, such as the United States, “will win the same-approach 
interactions in proportion to their advantage in relative power.”140  This implies the U.S. 
will obtain better results dependent on its relative strength if it adopts a networked 
approach to combating the terrorist threat.  The only limiting factor in this equation is 
time.  Every commander realizes the “Washington Clock” continues to tick and popular 
public opinion is the only variable that can extend the ever-dwindling timeline.  
To be successful, we must adopt what GEN(R) Stan McChrystal learned during 
his service as a task force commander: 
Al Qaeda in Iraq’s lieutenants did not wait for memos from their 
superiors, much less orders from bin Laden.  Decisions were not 
centralized, but were made quickly and communicated laterally across the 
organization.141 
We must adopt a similar, decentralized approach, and allow regional task forces 
to operate with autonomy.  Therefore, in order to successfully compete against the 
menace posed by a decentralized, global terrorist network, the organization must adopt a 
similar structure and social system.  Due to the complexity of the environment and the 
unstable conditions in which terrorists operate, the most appropriate design for this 
organization is, what Mintzberg terms, a divisional form, due to the diverse problem-set 
resident in each regional affiliate.142  Systemic to this organization is a group of 
“independent entities coupled together by a loose administrative structure.”143  A design 
of this nature provides an overlay in which a global, counter-terrorism (CT) network is 
placed on top of the existing non-state, terrorist actor.  
                                                 
139 Ivan Arreguin-Toft, “How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict,” International 
Security 26, no. 1 (Summer 2001): 121. 
140 Ibid., 121–122. 
141 Stanley A. McChrystal, “It Takes a Network,” ForeignPolicy.com, February 22, 2011, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/02/22/it_takes_a_network (accessed February 22, 2011). 
142 Henry Mintzberg, “The Structuring of Organizations,” in The Strategic Process: Concepts, 
Contexts, and Cases, 276-303 (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1988), 301. 
143 Ibid., 301. 
 71 
In order to adopt this form, a certain degree of bureaucracy is necessary; much 
like it is exhibited by the leadership of Ayman al-Zawahiri.  Therefore, the global, 
counter-terrorism organization must have a centralized command and control 
orchestrating and ensuring transparency between each of its divisions.  This strategic 
apex should reside within the interagency hub located within the National Capital Region 
(NCR) of the U.S. in order to allow easy access to key decision-makers within the 
government.  Many other CT focused start-ups recognize the importance of maintaining 
close communications and easy access to policy makers; it is essential to capture lessons 
already learned by these organizations.144  Because of their counter-terrorism functions, 
they retain a stakeholder status within the proposed organization and could benefit from 
mutual cooperation.  In addition to easy access to government stakeholders, the benefit of 
using the nation’s hub also capitalizes on the abundant resource pool resident within the 
district.  Over the past ten years there has been a steady migration of experts, both 
academic and technological, to the region, which could provide valuable inputs to the 
organization.  These come in the form of analysts who spent years deploying in support 
of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM as well as the 
targeting experts who refined the technical capabilities that provide fidelity on the 
locations and activities of terrorist leaders and facilitators. 
The subcomponents within this divisional organization will align with the 
respective threat in the region.  While the strategic apex remains close to the political 
elite, the operational components will remain close to the fight.  For example, both Iraq 
and Afghanistan would receive dedicated divisions due to the size and complexity of the 
terrorist threat in these existing warzones.  Using Mintzberg’s terminology, the support 
staff within the operating core must specialize in Middle-Eastern and Arab affairs with an 
expansive knowledge of tactical trends utilized by terrorists in this area.  Both 
organizations would focus their efforts toward al Qaeda in Iraq (AQIZ) and al Qaeda’s 
Senior Leaders (AQSL) while monitoring the splinter groups such as the Kurdistan 
                                                 
144 Kimberly Dozier, “U.S. Building a Network To Hit Militants,” MSNBC.MSN.com, January 05, 
2011, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/40930584/ns/us_news-security/ (accessed February 13, 2011).  This 
article discusses the stand-up of a counter-terrorism center in the nation’s capital to speed the sharing of 
information in order to decrease the time between targeting and military action. 
 72 
Workers Party, the Palestine Liberation Front, and Hezbollah in Iraq.  Likewise, 
subdivisions focusing on the emerging threats in Yemen—AQ in the Arabian Peninsula 
(AQAP), Somalia—al Shabaab, North Africa—AQ in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), as 
well as the threats emanating from Europe, the Pacific and South American would have a 
dedicated organization focused on their area of responsibility. 
The structure of these subcomponents cannot fit a pre-existing mold.  Due to the 
complexity of the environment and the unstable conditions posed by an adaptable 
adversary, the regional organizations must be what Mintzberg defines as an adhocracy.  
Each must “innovate in very complex ways” in order to counter the disparate threat since 
terrorists’ modus operandi in their respective regions generally differ.145  The current 
conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and to a certain extent, Pakistan, pose a very different 
problem for operational elements than those groups operating in the Horn of Africa, 
Indonesia, and Columbia.  On the violent end of the spectrum rests the threat of daily 
attacks or improvised explosive device ambushes.  On the opposite end resides the 
unknown prospect of a catastrophic attack being planned or the random kidnap for 
ransom operation to fund future terrorist operations.   
In order to effectively pursue these various threats, highly specialized regional 
experts must fill the adhocratic task force.  They must be allowed to operate 
independently and be given the authority to liaison directly with their respective agency 
and host nation counterparts.  Bureaucracy and protocols cannot hinder the lines of 
communication between the adhocratic sub-elements and their counterparts in other 
regions.  They must be empowered to make decisions or, at a minimum, access decision 
makers at a moment’s notice.  Non-state, terrorist actors are not restricted by boundaries, 
nor should the task forces.  In order to move as quickly as the enemy, the highly trained 
experts must rely on a high degree of mutual adjustment with specialists in other regions 
as well as unhindered vertical adjustment with the divisional leadership.146  Figure 3 
provides a rough diagram of how the divisional organization is structured with adhocratic 
sub-elements.  The adhocratic organizations within the divisional structure should reside 
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in their respective focus areas:  Iraq (IZ), Afghanistan-Pakistan (AFG/PAK), North 
Africa (Trans Sahel), Arabian Peninsula (AP), Europe (EU), Pacific (PAC), and South 
America (SA). 
 
Figure 7.   Divisional Organization with Adhocratic Sub-elements 
It is imperative, although not an easy task, to place each organization in a location 
that will allow it to be most effective; much in the way the strategic apex of the division 
should be located in NCR.  The task force focusing on the Iraqi terrorism problem set 
could be place in Baghdad with relative ease.  Similarly, the task force overseeing 
counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan could locate in Kabul or 
Islamabad.  The difficulty will arise in creating these organizations in areas outside of a 
combat zone because of limited U.S. Embassy housing and office space, the lack of a 
status of forces agreement (SOFA), or simply lack of support from the host nation due to 
their anti-U.S. policies.  For example, the ideal location to place a task force focusing on 
the AQAP problem set is Yemen.  If constraints prevent the task force from operating 
within the borders of the country, it could possibly find space in nearby Djibouti or Qatar.  
Both have a small U.S. military base with airfields.  From these locations, the task force 
could also focus its resources on the al Shabaab group in Somalia. 
A more daunting challenge is identifying the best location to establish an 
adhocratic task force in North Africa to counter AQTS.  The region extends over four 
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time zones and does not contain any governments with pro-U.S. agendas or tendencies.  
In this case it would be beneficial to co-locate with our French counterparts (if they are 
willing), since they declared war on AQIM in 2010 as a result of the assassination of 
French citizens by Nigerian and Mali terrorists.147  Similar problems arise when trying to 
identify the ideal location for European, Pacific, and South American task forces.  In 
these cases it would be best to co-locate with the Theater Commands and establish 
smaller sub-elements in countries that have a terrorism problem, and ideally, request U.S. 
assistance; however, this is not a necessary condition.  Figure 2 offers an example of an 
adhocratic organization with an AQIM focus with experts spread throughout the region. 
 
Figure 8.   Example of Adhocratic Organization with Focus on AQIM 
As previously mentioned, a problem establishing presence, whether requested or 
not, often lies in the ability to find a secure working space and billeting.  The U.S. 
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Department of State Bureau of Diplomatic Security (BDS) faces similar challenges while 
having an overlapping counter-terrorism mission through the execution of the Rewards 
for Justice Program.148  Although it operates out of 188 countries, there remain several 
key locations in which it could be effective.  The lack of embassy space and host nation 
cooperation are the limiting factors in conducting many CT operations simply because of 
the difficulty accessing the region.  The task forces must capitalize on the existing 
structures and partners in these difficult to reach countries and use existing organizations, 
such as the BDS, to assist their efforts.  They must also rely on partner nation assistance 
to access countries that are even more restrictive, such as Syria and Lebanon, to pass 
demarche requests or intelligence packets on terrorist residing within their borders. 
The CT task forces must transcend problems such as these through open lines of 
communication and vertical adjustment between regional task forces.  As evident in Iraq 
circa 2006, one third of the terrorist foreign fighters streaming into the country originated 
in North Africa, transiting through Syria, before crossing into Iraq.149  They recognize no 
borders or boundaries.  Similarly, the analytical experts within the task force must be 
allowed to bypass the barriers resident in theater and combatant commands.  The 
traditional dialogue required to cut across arbitrarily designated borders and areas of 
operation and or responsibility simply serves as a hindrance to effectiveness and results 
in slower reaction times for matters that are often time-sensitive.   
In addition to the horizontal integration between the regional task forces there 
must be an even higher degree of lateral coordination within the intra-agencies of the task 
force.  To maximize effectiveness, experts from the interagency as well as the 
Department of Defense will fill the positions within the task force in order to capitalize 
on each organization’s respective authorities.  The U.S. Department of State Bureau of 
Diplomatic Security is just one example of the many agencies and experts that are 
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government stakeholders roles and responsibilities and contributors to the task force 
goals.  The Department of State, Central Intelligence Agency, Department of Treasure, 
and Federal Bureau of Investigation also contribute to the pool of experts that will liaison 
with, if not hold seats in, the task force.  Every player must be allotted the autonomy to 
coordinate directly with representatives in another agency and across the task force 
regions and, when established, will most closely resemble Duncan’s matrix form.  This 
set-up will allow for the “flexible sharing of human resources,” will help “achieve 
coordination necessary to meet dual demands” such as those regions competing for 
resources, and is best suited to complex decision making and frequent changes in 
unstable environments, which is the type of setting provided by the global terrorist 
network.150  The organizational design will also follow Thompson’s theory in regards to 
reciprocal interdependence due to the horizontal feedback with respect to the task forces’ 
mission of global pursuit.151 
Each organization’s size and structure will morph dependent on two independent 
variables, the nature of the threat and the level of access to the region.  The nodes within 
a task force should consist of an experienced operational officer, an analytical expert of 
the region, and if possible, a communications specialist.  It is conceivable that there may 
be room for only one mature, responsible team member in a particular country of interest.  
In this situation, the ability to ask for external support through the region hub of experts 
will alleviate the need for a bigger presence under these less than permissive locations.  
In many cases it may be impossible to place one of the task force experts in a country, 
such as in Libya or Syria, due to diplomatic strains.  In these cases, the regional experts 
should be placed in surrounding countries that share our CT goals.  The nature of a 
specific region’s threat will also affect resource allocation.  As the threat in an area is 
reduced, the resources allocated to that region will be moved to areas in need; however, it 
is important not to completely withdraw all resources and repeat the mistakes made by 
the French in Algeria circa 1962.  
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In summary, a divisional organization is necessary to counter the existing terrorist 
network.  The sub-elements of the divisional structure should be regional adhocracies 
forged with operational and analytical experts who can navigate the interagency to 
identify solutions to counter the terrorist threat within their area of responsibility.  They 
must be able to capitalize on the existing authority’s resident in other agencies and offer 
multiple options to policy-makers who must make a decision or pass those options to the 
host nation government.  These specialists must also be able to communicate directly 
with task forces in other regions since the terrorist network recognize no boundaries.  
Foreign fighters routinely transit from Europe, North Africa, and the Arabian Peninsula 
to the Middle-Eastern warzones and often return to their country of origin to proliferate 
their destructive tendencies.  Our network must operate with the same freedom of 
maneuver. 
D. HUMAN RESOURCES 
Identifying the right people to fill the operational and analytical positions is 
essential to the organization’s success.  In order to maximize effectiveness, recruiting 
must focus on the individual’s expertise and abilities.  These attributes must already be 
ingrained in the individual; therefore, rather than focusing on a training program to create 
experts to fill a position, efforts should be directed toward screening applicants who 
already possess these skills.  The threat is here and now and the experts have grown and 
matured over the past ten years.  This pool of existing experts will continue to expand as 
long as the U.S. continues to send troops to Iraq, Afghanistan, and other troubled spots 
throughout the world.   
As was learned by “Wild” Bill Donovan while he stood up his force of OSS 
operatives, the proper psychological vetting of individuals and the establishment of a 
“sense of the importance of their mission” will ensure that those selected perform to the 
expected standards.152  Because of this, the members of the OSS were able to operate 
independently and accomplished complex, dangerous tasks behind enemy lines without 
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any supervision.  Those same criteria are applicable to the members of a CT task force.  
They must be given the autonomy and sense of purpose to operate alone while being 
empowered to make decisions.  This provides the intrinsic motivation to execute their 
mission to the highest of standards.   
The selection process provides an additional incentive for those who are chosen; it 
establishes a cohesion and sense of elitism for each individual allowed into the 
organization.  In order to retain this mindset, it is important to constantly assess the 
performance of the individual.  Those who fail to perform must be removed.  This should 
only occur when team members fail to uphold the standards and maturity necessary to 
operate in an independent setting. Members of the organization must be trusted to act 
accordingly to the stations they hold and are capable of adapt to their surroundings, 
specifically being able to adopt a personality that enables them to operate in an 
interagency and international environment.  If they cannot acclimate, they should not be 
punished, only returned to their former employer with accolades for their contributions. 
The events of 9/11 nationalized a vast number of individuals to fight the evils of 
terrorism.  Everyone who volunteers for the organization will already possess the shared 
values and norms of those motivated individuals who signed up to fight.  Their goal is to 
seek out and punish those responsible for the event as well as those who wish to replicate 
similar such events.  Each successful operation that results in the prevention of another 
terrorist attack or that leads to the capture or kill of a known terrorist provides additional 
incentives for the organization’s members.  Success breeds additional success and builds 
cohesiveness, not only within the organization, but also within the international and 
interagency community who wish to be a part of that success. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Fusion Nodes will provide the U.S. government a joint-interagency means to 
integrate operations and intelligence with its allies and host-nations partners on a global 
scale to proactively degrade, deny and defeat terrorist networks.  In order to accomplish 
this, it is critical to examine the organizational design requirements needed by Fusion 
Nodes.  These requirements are: 
 79 
• Identify any entity inside or outside of the Fusion Node who: has a vested 
interest in counterterrorism operations, will be affected by the 
counterterrorism strategy implemented by the Fusion Node, or is in a 
position to effect the adoption or execution of the Fusion Node’s 
counterterrorism strategy 
• Address the forces and objects that shape the Fusion Node and ensure its 
members are in agreement to achieve the unified purpose 
• Identifying the right people to fill the operational and analytical positions 
is essential to the organization’s success 
• A group of “independent entities coupled together by a loose 
administrative structure 
If these are requirement are met, Fusion Nodes will be a key component of the 
U.S. government efforts to target the global terrorist threat posed by Al Qaida, its 
affiliates, and other networked terrorist organizations.   
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